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INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VERSUS THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF 
STATES: 
A Critical Inquiry into the Continuing Tension in the International Investment 
Regime 
 
 
George K. Ndi* 
 
Abstract: 
 
Events in Latin American countries have re-ignited the debate over the constitutive legal process 
governing the international regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI). These events have once 
again thrown into focus the continuing tension between sovereign rights and international property 
rights within the framework of the natural resources development agreements. This article sets out 
to explore their implications for the natural resources sector which has traditionally provided the 
setting for the debate on the international regulation of FDI. It posits the view that the long standing 
friction between the property rights of the FDI party and the sovereign rights of host States could in 
one sense be seen to a natural consequence of the private-public character dichotomy of State 
contracts in international economic law. The main thrust of the article is directed at a critical 
appraisal of the contemporary international legal problems of natural resources development 
agreements with a view to exploring possible long term solutions. The discussion will include: (1) a 
critical appraisal of  the private-public law dichotomous character of natural resources agreements; 
(2) a critical inquiry into the source of the friction between private property rights and sovereign 
rights within the international investment regime  and the persistent problems involving the 
prioritization of norms to govern FDI agreements; and (3) conclude by arguing  that the requirement 
for FDI protection ought not to foreclose the search for lasting solutions to the friction, not least the 
continued quest for an international lex specialis for international investment law.  
*Director of the LL.M by Dissertation Course & Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, 
University of Huddersfield, England, United Kingdom; LL.M, Ph.D  (University of Dundee, 
Scotland); Licence/Maitrise en Droit (University of Yaoundé, Cameroon).  
I would like to thank Dr Paul Richards and Ms Tina Hart, both of The Law School, University of 
Huddersfield, for their support and encouragement in the course of conducting this research. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Events in Latin America have once more raised questions about the 
constitutive legal process governing the international regulation of foreign direct 
investment (“FDI”) in the natural resources sector. These events have again exposed 
the fractious nature of the relationship between host States and overseas private 
investors in the form of multinational petroleum and mining companies.1 They 
include the promulgation in 2001 by the Venezuelan government of a new 
Hydrocarbons Law which ratified the concept of national sovereignty over natural 
resources. This was followed by Decree No.5200 of 2007 implementing the law of 
2001. Decree No.5200 made provisions for the transfer of multinational oil company 
assets and shares to the State, in particular the handing over by these companies of 
equity stakes in Venezuela‟s Orinoco Oil Belt operations to the State Oil Company, 
Petróleos de Venezuela.2 Meanwhile in Bolivia, the government embarked on a 
number of indigenization programs which in 2006 led to the taking over by the State 
of equity interests in a number of foreign oil and gas concerns operating in the 
country. These initiatives culminated in a number of nationalizations in the energy 
and electricity sectors in 2010.3    
 
The provisions of Venezuela‟s Decree No.5200 and the various programs 
embarked upon by the Bolivian government may be classed as “direct takings” under 
the international law principles governing the nationalization or expropriation of alien 
property.4 Furthermore in 2008, following investment disputes with foreign petroleum 
and mining companies, Ecuador decided to withdraw its consent to arbitration under 
                                                          
1
 See George Joffe, Paul Stevens, Tony George, Jonathan Lux & Carl Searle, Expropriation of Oil and Gas 
Investments: Historical, Legal and Economic Perspectives in an Age of Resource Nationalism, 2 J. WORLD 
ENERGY L. & BUS. 3-23 (2009). 
2
 IŶ ϮϬϬϴ a Ŷuŵďeƌ of ĐoŵpaŶies opeƌatiŶg iŶ VeŶezuela͛s OƌiŶoĐo Oil delt agƌeed to ĐoŵplǇ ǁith the 
provisions of the new law; these included Chevron, Statoil, Total, ENI, BP and Sinopec. Companies refusing to 
comply included ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips: see Fact Sheet: Arbitration Between ExxonMobil and 
Venezuela, available at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com; see also Jens Gould, Venezuela Tightens Oil Grip, in 
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, ARPIL 14 2006.  
3
 For a chronological record of these events, see Bolivia Takes Over BP Subsidiary, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/8030208.stm; Bolivia Nationalises Energy Firm, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/world/americas/7848615.stm; Bolivia Nationalizes Three Private Electricity Firms, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/8656106.stm  
4
 See Christopher Dugen & Joseph Profaizer, Venezuela Launches Next Stage of Expropriation, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications; Brian Alperstein & Marco Kirby, What is Really Behind the 
Nationalizations in Latin America? The Cases of Venezuela and Bolivia, available at 
http://www.Imvlaw.com/archivos/117966530.pdf. For an analysis of the public international law principles 
governing nationalization and expropriation, see  Jeménez de Aréchaga, International Responsibility,  in 
MAX SØRENSON (ED), MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 533 (1968); Edwin Bourchard, The 
Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreign Nationals, 20 
AM. J. INT͛L L ϳϯϴ ;ϭϵϮϲͿ; IAN d‘OWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY, PART 1 
(1983); L. Goldie, International Responsibility and the Expropriation of Property, ϭϮ INT͛L LAWYE‘ ϲϯ ;ϭϵϳϴͿ; 
F.A. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, ϱϰ AM. J. INT͛L L ϱϳϮ ;ϭϵϲ0). See also, for the public 
international law consequences of indirect forms of nationalization, Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of 
Alien Property, 1 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INV. L.J. 41 (1986); Burns Weston, Constructive Takings under 
International Law: A Modest FoƌaǇ iŶto the Pƌoďleŵ of ͚CƌeepiŶg EǆpƌopƌiatioŶ͛, ϭϲ VA.J. INT͛L L. ϭϬϯ ;ϭϵϳϱͿ; 
Catherine Yannaca-“ŵall, ͞IŶdiƌeĐt EǆpƌopƌiatioŶ͟ aŶd the ͞‘ight to ‘egulate͟ iŶ IŶteƌŶatioŶal IŶǀestŵeŶt Laǁ, 
WORKING PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, OECD (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546. 
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the auspices of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”).5 This followed Bolivia‟s decision the previous year to denounce the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States (“ICSID Convention”).6 Meanwhile Nicaragua has also advocated 
withdrawing from the ICSID Convention.7 Unsurprisingly the natural resources 
sector, which historically has been the focus in the battle for supremacy between the 
sovereign rights of host nations and the private property rights of the FDI party, has 
once again provided the setting for the latest events.8    
 
These developments, as expected, have been the subject of much academic 
discourse. The discussions have so far focused primarily on a growing reaction by 
capital importing developing countries, mainly from Latin America, against the 
pervasive impact of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”). Another grievance centers 
on the perception of consistently unfavorable outcomes of the international 
arbitration process, with many awards rendered in favor of investors and against 
capital-importing countries.9 Other issues identified by leading scholars and 
commentators as possible causes of the current Latin American discontent with the 
international investment regime are, inter alia, the disproportionate number of 
investment arbitration cases brought against developing countries;10 the lack of 
reciprocity or the unevenness of BITs in the distribution of rights and obligations; the 
attribution to private foreign investors of directly effective rights which endows and 
confers upon them locus standi in international law; and perceived substantive bias 
and procedural shortcomings of the international arbitration process.11  
 
This article, whilst acknowledging the “BITs” premise which has been the 
principal focus of recent academic discourse, will argue that the root cause of the 
continuing discontent on the part of capital importing countries with the international 
investment regime lies in the substantive principles of the constitutive legal process 
governing the regime.12 Amongst its key submissions the article will posit the view 
                                                          
5
 Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign 
Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT͛L L.J. ϰϵϭ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ, at ϰϵϮ.  
6
 Id. 
7
 See Susan Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, ϱϬ HA‘V. INT͛L L.J. ϰϯϱ 
(2009), at 436; Kate Supnik, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing Interests 
in International Investment Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 343 (2009). 
8
 See further Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes, 
230 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1991-V), at 175-94.  
9
 See supra note 7. 
10
 Rebecca Dreyfus, Latin America Faces 61% of Ongoing Mining Cases at the International Center  for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, available at  http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=16890. 
11
 Kaushal, supra note 5, at 492, 497 where the author has also identified amongst these growing concerns the 
eǆpaŶsiǀe iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the suďstaŶtiǀe laǁ goǀeƌŶiŶg FDI aŶd aŵoŶgst the pƌoĐeduƌal shoƌtĐoŵiŶgs ͞the 
broad rendering of the arbitrability of disputes by aƌďitƌatoƌs͟. See also P. Cahier, The Strengths and 
Weaknesses of International Arbitration Involving a State as a Party, in J. LEW (ED), CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 241 (1986); Z. Douglas, The Hybrid Foundation of Modern 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, ϳϰ d‘IT.Y.d.INT͛L L. ϭϱϭ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ; M. “O‘NA‘AJAH, THE INTE‘NATIONAL LAW OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT (3
rd
 EDN, 2010). 
12
 J. BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958), at 1 proffers the view, with regard 
to the shortcomings of iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ iŶ geŶeƌal, that ͞the ƌeĐeŶt liteƌatuƌe oŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ ďeaƌs 
witness to the belief among international lawyers that many of the postulates which traditionally pass for 
international law are unrealities from which their system must be freed, if it is to be kept in touch with the 
faĐts of iŶteƌŶatioŶal life … The task is ǁoƌth atteŵptiŶg Ŷot oŶlǇ foƌ the Đƌedit of iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ as a suďjeĐt  
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that the concerns, both past and present, expressed over the international 
investment regime are symptomatic of a more deep rooted jurisprudential problem. 
This is a problem which may be traced to the very door of the traditional principles of 
customary international law which govern State responsibility and the diplomatic 
protection of aliens and their property.13 Viewed from another perspective, the recent 
developments affecting FDI in the natural resources sector should not be seen in 
isolation but ought to be understood as part of an ongoing historical process.  
 
Writing in 1978 García-Amador had observed that existing principles of 
customary international law on State responsibility were developed in an era when 
colonialism, territorial conquest and imperial domination were all considered as 
legitimate aspirations of the major maritime powers.14 He argued that this state of 
affairs led to much discontent and resentment on the part of smaller and weaker 
states, mainly from the developing world, towards some of the rules and principles 
established in that era.15 Following this discontent, early attempts by Latin American 
nations to roll back the boundaries of established principles of customary 
international law on State responsibility could be seen in the emergence in the region 
of putative norms of international law such as the Calvo and Drago doctrines.16 The 
author argues that these doctrines were clear and unequivocal expressions of the 
philosophy behind Latin American attempts to revise some of the traditional 
principles and institutions of international economic law.17 It will be further submitted 
as part of the present discourse that recent events having significant adverse 
impacts on the legal security of FDI in Latin America are but a continuation of the 
historical process which defines efforts by capital importing developing countries to 
revise the international investment regime, including its customary international law 
foundations.18 
 
The principle of State responsibility in foreign expropriation cases has 
generally been regarded by publicists to be the principal foundation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
deseƌǀiŶg of sĐieŶtifiĐ studǇ, ďut also foƌ pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeasoŶs.͟ For a further discussion of the weaknesses of the 
international legal system and other problems of international law, see Higgins, supra note 8, in particular 
Chapter 2: Sources of International Law: Provenance and Problems, at 42-66; OPPENHEIM, THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1955), at 58; JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS (1948), at 2; B. RÖLING, Les 
Principes du Droit International Public, 77 RECUEIL DES COURS (1950), at 11. 
13
 Cf. C.G. Fenwick, International Law: The Old and the New, ϲϬ AM. J. INT͛L L. ϰϳϱ ;ϭϵϲϲͿ; A. Gƌahl-Madsen, 
International Law at the Crossroads, in SCAND. STUDIES IN LAW (1980), at 177-86.  
14
 F.V. García-Amador, Current Attempts to Revise International Law: A Comparative Study, ϳϳ AM. J. INT͛L L. 
286 (1978); Higgins, supra note 8, at 36. 
15
 See Verzijl, Western European Influence on the Foundations of International Law, ϭ INT͛L ‘ELATION“ ϭϯϳ 
(1955-IV); for a critique of the view that developing nations have not contributed to the development of 
customary international law, see generally ALEXANDROWICZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE 
LAW OF NATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES (1967).  
16
 One of the main criticisms levied against the traditional principles of customary international law which 
regulate the FDI regime has been their encroachment on the principle of national sovereignty, in particular 
their circumscription of the public power prerogative of regulatory intervention in natural resources 
development projects involving the infusion of FDI. For more on this see generally F.V. GARCÍA-AMADOR, THE 
CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS, VOLS.I&II, (1984); see also WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A 
CHANGING SOCIETY (1964); T.O. ELIAS, NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992). 
17
GARCÍA-AMADOR, supra note 16, at 286-88.  
18
 All ƌefeƌeŶĐes iŶ this aƌtiĐle to ͞iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ͟ aƌe to public international law. 
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international law regulating the FDI process.19 As such the principle forms the 
bedrock of the constitutive legal process governing the relationship between the 
foreign investor and the host State within the framework of natural resources 
development agreements. However, the search for adequate long term solutions to 
the legal problems affecting FDI in the natural resources sector has for long been 
obscured by the intense controversy surrounding the debate on the legal protection 
of FDI. The precise nature and substantive content of the applicable legal regime in 
this area has never clearly been defined to the satisfaction of all interest groups and 
stakeholders involved in the process.20 Over the years diverse principles and 
competing standards have emerged to vie for supremacy.21 Informing this 
competition is the conflict between the international property rights of foreign 
investors and the sovereign rights of host States. At the center of the conflict 
competing principles converge, each staking a superior claim to legitimacy in the 
prioritization of the sources of law governing the rights and entitlements of the 
principal parties to transnational natural resources development agreements - the 
host State on the one hand and the FDI party on the other. 
 
The various theories, views and norms postulated by the different schools of 
thought (although not mutually exclusive) have often tended to fall short of an all-
embracing, comprehensive formula capable of addressing or satisfying the specific 
needs, aspirations or concerns of all stakeholders.22 The sustained emphasis of the 
traditional exposition of the legal foundations of the customary international law on 
State responsibility, for instance, has tended to focus primarily on FDI protection.23 
Postulated alternative norms of international law, on the other hand, have aspired 
primarily towards promoting the pre-eminence of the sovereign and public power 
prerogatives of the host State within the framework of natural resources 
development agreements in particular, and the international investment regime as a 
whole.24 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the views of each school of thought have been 
fiercely contested by the opposite camp.25 The chief consequence of these 
competing opinions has been that as a jurisprudential matter the source of 
international law obligations in FDI relations has been the subject of much 
                                                          
19
 See PIETER VAN THEMAAT, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1981); ABBA 
KOLO, STATE REGULATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY RIGHTS, PHD DISSERTATION, UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE 
(1994). 
20
 Cf.  E.I. Nwogugu, Legal Problems of Foreign Investment, 153 RECUEIL DES COURS 167 (1976); F.V. García-
Amador, State Responsibility – Some New Problems, 94 RECUEIL DES COURS 369 (1958-II).  
21
 See further ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD (1986); Rosalyn Higgins, The 
Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 263 
(1982-III). 
22
 For a comprehensive treatise of the competing sources of law on State responsibility, see generally GARCÍA-
AMADOR, supra note 16; see also W.G. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1964); ROSALYN HIGGINS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD (1965). 
23
 F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS (1932); H. Schemers, Judicial Protection of International Rights, 
23 GE‘M.Y.d.INT͛L L ϭϴϭ ;ϭϵϴϬͿ; “tepheŶ “Đhǁeďel, International Protection of Contractual Arrangements, 53 
A.S.I.L PROCS. 266 (1959); Georg Schwarzenberger, The Protection of British Property Abroad, 5 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBS. 295 (1952). 
24
 See H.S. Zakariya, Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Search for a New International Economic 
Order, 4 NAT. RES. F. 75 (1980); KAMAL HOSSAIN (ED), LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER (1980). 
25
 See further F.V. García-Amador, A Basic Dispute: Conflicting Views on Expropriation, in J. NORTON (ED), 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE FUTURE WORLD ORDER (1987): Chapter 7. 
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controversy, if not uncertainty. This remains the case notwithstanding what appears 
to have been a paradigm shift in recent years towards the traditional position and its 
embedding in BITs and a number of international arbitral awards.26 This article will 
posit the view that the transformation witnessed within the sector in the past 20-30 
years (from restrictiveness to investment promotion and protection) would seem to 
suggest more a policy response to prevailing economic exigencies than a 
wholehearted conversion on the part of resource-rich but capital-poor developing 
nations to the doctrinal precepts and prescriptions of customary international law 
governing the international investment regime.27  
 
But is the evolution of a regime which is capable of satisfactorily addressing 
the needs of all stakeholders in the international investment process a possibility? 
The often conflicting long term interests of the host State and the FDI party greatly 
complicates and further compounds the difficulty of the task involved. A need for a 
full awareness of the limitations imposed by political and legal constraints (the latter 
in the form of regime-specific established norms and practices) to the attainment of 
the much required equilibrium is likewise to be counseled. But this ought not to 
dissuade the continuing quest for viable long term solutions. It is thus proposed as 
part of this article to critically inquire into the precise nature and substantive content 
of the relevant principles with a view to attempting a contribution, however modest, 
to this long running debate. 
 
At the sharp end of the controversy over FDI protection has been the specific 
nature of the relationship between host nations and multinational companies in the 
natural resources sector - with particular reference to oil, gas and mineral exploration 
and exploitation.28 The dynamics of this relationship, from both a historical and a 
contemporary perspective, will serve as the background to this discourse. The article 
examines not just contemporary legal problems of the international investment 
regime but the FDI process as a whole, including an analysis of regime-specific 
policies and practices and their contribution to both the tension in the regime and to 
the ensuing debate.29 In view of this orientation the perspective informing the article 
will be both theoretical and practical - in that theoretical postulations on the principle 
of State responsibility will be analyzed and tested against the background of past 
                                                          
26
 S.H. Amin, The Iran-US Claims Settlement, ϯϮ INT͛L & COMP. L.Q. ϳϱϬ ;ϭϵϴϯͿ. 
27
 See Thomas Wälde, Investment Policies in the International Petroleum Industry: Response to the Current 
Crisis, in N. BEREDJICK & T. WÄLDE, PETROLEUM INVESTMENT POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (1988). 
28
 See generally Robert Jennings, Rules Governing Contracts Between States and Foreign Nationals, in RIGHTS 
AND DUTIES OF PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 123 (1965); A.A. Fatouros, International Law and the 
Internationalized Contract, ϳϰ AM. J. INT͛L L. ϭϯϰ ;ϭϵϴϬͿ; Loǁell WadŵoŶd, Basic Problems of Foreign Oil 
Operations, in R. WILSON (ED), PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1960 INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD 537 
(1960); and Philippe Kahn, Problèmes Juridiques des Investissements Étrangeres dans les Pays en Voie de 
Développement, ϱϮ INT͛L L. & A‘d. ‘EP. ϴϯϱ ;ϭϵϲϲͿ. 
29
 For analyses of specific problems regarding the legally binding character of international investment 
agreements, see Lowell Wadmond, The Sanctity of Contract Between a Sovereign and a Foreign National, in 
SELECTED READINGS ON THE PROTECTION BY LAW OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 139 (1964), 
(hereinafter SELECTED READINGS); see also Hans Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, ϱϯ AM.J. INT͛L L. ϳϴϲ ;ϭϵϱϵͿ; 
George Ray, Some Reasons for the Binding Force of Development Contracts Between States and Foreign 
Nationals, 16 BUS. L. 942 (1961). 
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and current policies and practices affecting FDI in the natural resources sector.30 If 
effective long term solutions are to be found to the problems of the international 
investment regime the controversy surrounding the source(s) of obligation in host 
State/foreign investor relations, and their prioritization, will first of all have to be 
resolved - not least in view of the sometimes inconsistent outcomes of international 
arbitral judgments on the question.31 It is hoped that the current exercise may 
contribute towards fostering a much improved understanding of the specific nature of 
the international legal problems of FDI as a pre-requisite in the search for long term 
solutions. 
 
From a historical perspective, current events informing the FDI regime cannot 
altogether be separated from the somewhat confusing background of diverse 
theoretical expositions spawned by a wide spectrum of international legal thought on 
questions concerning the international regulation of domestic natural resources 
development. It could in fact be said that the legal aspect is but one factor, albeit a 
very important one, of the general framework which informs and governs FDI in the 
sector. For a complete picture one must also look to the general political, historical, 
socio-economic and cultural contexts.32 The discussion in Part II will concentrate on 
the background to the international regulation of natural resources development and 
the way in which this background continues to inform the tension between 
international property rights and sovereign rights. The discourse will focus on the 
historical, political and economic background to the debate on the international 
regulation of FDI. From an economic viewpoint the pivotal role of FDI in the 
development of domestic natural resources will be analyzed. The main thrust of the 
analyses will be directed at examining the evolutionary context of the international 
regulation of natural resources development. It will thus include a critical 
commentary on the controversy surrounding the prioritization of international norms 
governing substantive legal obligations in natural resources development 
agreements.  
 
Part III reviews the contractual and legal framework of natural resources 
agreements against the background of the tension between international property 
rights and sovereign rights. An analytical, as opposed to a purely descriptive 
approach, will aim at providing some insights into the relationship between 
contractual practice and some of the basic precepts on which international 
                                                          
30
 For more on the dynamics of the host State/foreign investor relationship and its possible implications for the 
evolution of international law on the subject, see A.H. Hermann, Disputes Between States and Foreign 
Companies, in J. LEW (ED), CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 250 (1986).  
31
 Brigitte Stern, Trois Arbitrages, Un Même Problème, Trois Solutions: Les Nationalisations Pètrolières 
Libyennes deǀaŶt l͛Arbitrage International, iŶ ‘EV. DE L͛A‘dIT‘AGE ϭ-43 (1980), at 3; see also Robin White, 
Expropriation of the Libyan Oil Concessions: Two Conflicting International Arbitrations, 30 INT͛L & COMP. L.Q. 
1-19  (1981). Some authors have also drawn attention to the lack of clarity in the decisions of international 
arbitration tribunals on FDI disputes: see Richard Lillich and David Bederman, Jurisprudence of the Foreign 
Claims Settlement Commission: Iran Claims, ϵϭ AM. J. INT͛L L. ϰϯϲ-65 (1997). 
32
 Cf. Tatiana Gulberg, International Concessions: A Problem of International Economic Law, 25 ACTA 
SCANDINAVICA JURIS GENTIUM 18 (1955); J. HARTSHORN, OIL COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS (1965);  M. 
KAPLAN & N. DE KALZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961);  Z. MIKDASHI, 
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES (1976); E.I. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1965); G.W. STOCKING, MIDDLE EAST OIL: A STUDY IN 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROVERSY (1971); F. SNYDER & S. SATHIRATHAI (EDS), THIRD WORLD 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).   
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investment regime is founded. The discussion will explore relevant aspects of the 
tension between international property rights and the sovereign rights within the 
context of the contractual and regulatory framework of petroleum and mineral 
development agreements. Progressing from this aspect, the international legal 
context of natural resources development agreements and its impact on the tension 
will constitute the principal subject of Part IV. This section examines the key question 
of characterization or categorization of natural resources development agreements in 
the international investment regime. The analyses in this Part will extend to an 
examination of internationalization (through “externalization” of the conflict resolution 
process) and stabilization, and their role in the conflict between international property 
rights and sovereign rights.  
 
Part V embarks on a reappraisal of the sovereign right of the host State to 
regulate the FDI relationship and its impact on the doctrine of acquired rights. It 
examines the public power prerogatives of host States and the “right to regulate” by 
critically inquiring into its precise nature within the framework of FDI projects and 
also assesses the permissible limits of the exercise of such rights under international 
law. The analyses in this part thus incorporate the main theme of the friction between 
international property rights and sovereign rights which informs the whole discussion. 
It will be seen as part of this discourse that the conceptual eclecticism which has 
been the source of so much confusion in this area of international law is in many 
ways a product of the divergent doctrinal postulations on these key concepts. Part V 
will conclude with some thoughts on an international lex specialis for the international 
investment regime.33 It will argue that contemporary realities in the natural resources 
sector call for a rethinking - not a complete abandonment - of the conceptual basis of 
emergent norms. It will further be argued that such a rethinking ought to form part of 
the process of evolving a „sui generis‟ corpus juris to govern the international 
investment regime of the future.  
 
The emergent norms - Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
(PSNR),34  the New International Economic Order (NIEO)35 and the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS)36 – which were so vigorously 
postulated and advanced in an earlier era as peremptory norms (jus cogens) now 
appear obsolete and seemingly irrelevant to the FDI regime.37 Their complete 
rejection implies an instinctive recourse to established principles of customary 
international law. But the latter have been perceived as not according a sufficient 
emphasis to the national economic development goals and objectives of host nations 
- goals which are seen to be implicit in resources development projects.38 It will be 
                                                          
33
 To avoid any possible confusion the term lex specialis is preferred in this case to that of the lex mercatoria 
which has been used with specific reference to transnational commercial transactions. In this article the 
possible application of the lex specialis will be argued with specific reference to international investment 
agreements.  
34
 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1803, XVIII of 14 December 1962 
35
 UNGA Resolution 3201, S-VI of 1 May 1974. 
36
 UNGA Resolution 3281, XXIX of 12 December 1974. 
37
 See A.O. Adede, International Law and Property Rights of Aliens: The Old Order Changeth, 19 MALAYA L. 
REV. 175 (1977); for an assessment of the limited impact of the new norms on the international investment 
regime, see V. Rodriguez-Padilla, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: The End of an Era? 3 ENERGY STUDIES 
REV. 108 (1991). 
38
 S.K.B. Asante, Traditional Concepts versus the Developmental Imperatives in Transnational Investment Law, 
in R. DUPUY (ED), COLLOQUIUM ON THE RIGHTS TO DEVELOPMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 352 (1979); 
 9 
submitted in this discourse that it is this perception which in part aggravates incipient 
cultural, political and legal tensions within the framework of a natural resources 
project. This ultimately increases the sovereign risk of regulatory intervention by the 
host state in the form of fiscal measures, an indirect taking or outright 
nationalization.39  
 
The article will conclude by arguing the need for a revision of the substantive 
legal basis of the FDI regime.40 The conclusion‟s gravamen is founded on the 
absence of consensus (or near universal support) which is critical for upholding the 
legitimacy of the substantive rules, procedures and processes which govern the 
current international investment regime.41 Its main premise will be based on the 
requirement for an improved and unified international legal order which is more 
capable of providing effective long term solutions to the legal problems of FDI, 
particularly those relating to the stability of investment relations in transnational 
natural resources development ventures.    
 
 
II.  THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
DEVELOPMENT: HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
BACKGROUND 
      
In the period prior to independent nationhood for African, Asian and Middle 
Eastern countries, international petroleum and mining companies had established for 
themselves seemingly unassailable positions with regard to ownership or acquired 
rights over production and deposits.42 Many of these companies had their upstream 
operations in territories which were then under the direct political control and 
administration of their home countries, the latter acting as colonial authorities. But 
following the decolonization process and the coming of independence to these 
territories, the profound structural changes which accompanied this transformation in 
the global political landscape implied new challenges for multinational resource 
companies.43  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
M. Lachs, International Law in a Multi-Cultural World, iŶ JU“ ͛ϴϭ UPP“ALA P‘OCEEDING“ ϭϴϯ ;ϭϵϴϭͿ; J. KuŶz, 
Pluralism of Legal Systems and Value Systems and International Law, ϰϵ AM. J. INT͛L L. ϯϳϬ ;ϭϵϱϱͿ.   
39
 Cf. S.K. Date-Bah, The Contract as a Mechanism for Taxation, 6 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 41 (1988) 
40
 For similar arguments with particular reference to oil concessions, see Michael Dickstein, Revitalizing the 
International Law Governing Concession Agreements, ϲ INT͛L TAX & dU“. L. ϱϰ ;ϭϵϴϴͿ.  
41
 The basis of obligation in international law (be it customary international law, treaty or convention law) 
being in the main consensual. On the question of consent to international law obligations and the factors 
which serve as yardsticks for measuring consent, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2008), at 4-18. See also Higgins, supra note 8, at 36-67; Verzijl, supra note 15, at 138-40; BRIERLY, supra 
note 12, at 1-67; P.E. Corbett, The Consent of States and the Sources of International Law, 6 BRIT.Y.B. INT͛L L. 
20 (1925) at 55-80, 340-54; G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the 
Problem of Enforcement, 19 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1956); E. LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1991), at 23-58.   
42
 See, for a discussion on the concept of acquired rights, P. Lalive, The Doctrine of Acquired Rights, in RIGHTS 
AND DUTIES OF PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 145 (1965); I. FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION: A STUDY IN THE 
PROTECTION OF ALIEN PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1974); ZOUHAIR KRONFOL, PROTECTION OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972). 
43
 See HARTSHORN, supra note 32; Kenneth Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationalization, 52 AM. J. 
INT͛L L. ϮϲϬ ;ϭϵϱϴͿ; HeŶƌǇ CattaŶ, Past and Present Trends in Middle Eastern Oil Concessions and Agreements, 
in CAMERON (ED), PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD – PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
135 (1969); J. Attwell, The Changing Relationships Between Host Governments and International Petroleum 
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These challenges were not limited to the need for a readjustment to the new 
geo-political situation by the companies. They extended to a re-examination of the 
theory and practice of international resources law and policy, in particular the 
constitutive legal process governing the regulation of FDI in the development of 
domestic natural endowments within the context of the new political landscape.44 
Foremost amongst these challenges was the precise legal character of the 
relationship between multinational petroleum/ mining companies and the newly 
independent host countries.45 What factors, therefore, define the legal context for the 
international development of domestic natural resources? Which legal concepts or 
body of principles inform the constitutive legal framework with regard to the form and 
legal character of international resources development agreements involving FDI? It 
is proposed to examine these questions from both a legal and historical perspective, 
and where relevant, the evolutionary context in which these questions may be 
viewed over the past five decades. 
 
An equally important question involves the characterization or categorization 
of natural resources development agreements within the international investment 
regime. Such agreements are neither contracts stricto sensu (i.e. agreements 
between private parties); nor are they inter-State agreements such as, for example, 
BITs which are agreements between sovereign governments. Natural resources 
development agreements straddle the recognized boundaries between these two 
forms of agreements;46 they also bestride the accepted demarcations between 
private law and public law,47 national law and international law.48 The question of 
categorization has itself developed into a bone of contention; for on this question 
rides the permissible limits of national regulatory competence within the framework 
of domestic natural resources development ventures made possible through the 
infusion of foreign capital and technological expertise. Before examining these 
questions, it is proposed first to review the historical and political background to the 
debate over the legal regime governing the international development of domestic 
natural resources. This will be followed by an analysis of the indispensable role 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Companies, 17 HOUS. L. REV. 1015 (1980); KAMAL HOSSAIN, LAW AND POLICY IN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT: 
CHANGING RELATIONS BETWEEN TRANSNATIONALS AND GOVERNMENTS (1979); JUHA KUUSI, THE HOST 
STATE AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (1979). 
44
 Cf. Jeménez de Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS 1 (1978-
I). 
45
  Pierre Barraz, The Legal Status of Oil Concessions, 5 J.W.T.L. 609 (1971); H. Calvert, The Law Applicable to 
Concessions, 1 MALAYA L. REV. 265 (1959). 
46
 Robert Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, ϯϴ d‘IT.Y.d.INT͛L L. ϭϱϲ ;ϭϵϲϭͿ, at ϭϳϳ; AƌŶold MĐNaiƌ, 
The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, ϯϯ d‘IT.Y.d. INT͛L L. ϭ ;ϭϵϱϳͿ, at ϭϬ; J.D. 
MITCHELL, THE CONTRACTS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES (1954); Turpin, Public Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 24 (1984); G. Van Hecke, Contracts Between States and Foreign Private 
Law Persons, in R. BERHARDT (ED) ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1984), at 54; GEORG 
SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1969); HENRY STEINER & DETLEV 
VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (1986).   
47
 See further George Haight, The Choice of Public International Law as the Applicable Law in Development 
Contracts with Foreign Governments, in MCDANIELS (ED), INTERNATIONAL FINANCING AND INVESTMENT 554 
(1964); M. Sornarajah, The Myth of International Contract Law, 15 J.W.T.L. 187 (1981).  
48
 See A. Giardina, State Contracts: National Law versus International Law?, ϱ ITALIAN Y.d. INT͛L L. ϭϰϳ ;ϭϵϴϬ-
81); Günther Jaenicke, Consequences of a Breach of an Investment Agreement Governed by International Law, 
by General Principles of Law, or by Domestic Law of the Host State, in D. DICKE (ED), FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 
THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 177 (1987). 
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played by FDI in the development of domestic natural endowments in developing 
countries.  
 
A. Historical and Political Background to the Debate on FDI Regulation. 
 
When in the period following independence from colonial rule the oil 
producing developing countries embarked on a self-assertive course of radical 
economic nationalism, many had perceived themselves to be accepting the 
challenge of destiny and the call to full nationhood.49 This course of action, driven in 
part by national aspirations towards political self-determination and sovereign control 
over the exploitation of domestic natural resources, was to bring them (wittingly or 
unwittingly) into direct confrontation with the established norms and precepts of 
customary international law. Amongst these were the doctrines of State 
succession,50 State responsibility and the diplomatic protection of aliens and their 
property.51 The path to national sovereignty over domestic natural resources was not 
restricted to outright nationalization; new forms of contractual arrangements, mainly 
in the form of participation agreements, also emerged at this time.52 But the unilateral 
nature of these initiatives at the behest of host nations, aimed mainly at embracing 
new economic policies and political attitudes, inevitably meant the placing of various 
forms of restrictions on the role of FDI in the development of domestic natural 
resources.53 Historical antecedents in the industry appeared then to offer little useful 
alternatives to the often confrontational approach adopted by host countries. 
 
If international law - in most cases the final arbiter in the various disputes 
which ensued between host countries and multinational resource companies - 
appeared poised to offer some measure of legal protection to the overseas investor, 
it however seemed to inspire little confidence in the host countries. The latter, for the 
most part, perceived their contribution to the development of the customary 
international law principles governing the international investment regime to be at 
best minimal and at worst non-existent.54 Appeals for the revision of what was 
perceived to be the „outdated‟ principles which form the traditional basis of 
                                                          
49
 DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER (1992). 
50
 This doctrine ensured the transmission of concession arrangement obligations from pre-independence 
authorities to post-independent governments and similar commitments from pre-revolutionary to post-
revolutionary regimes; see generally D. O͛CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967). 
51
 See H.A. Kuhn, Nationalisation of Foreign-Owned Property and its Impact on International Law, 45 AM. J. 
INT͛L L. ϳϬϵ ;ϭϵϱϭͿ. 
52
 Benedetto Constantino, State Participation in Oil Concessions: A New Kind of Taking of Foreign Property?, 1 
ITALIAN Y.d. INT͛L L. ϭϱϬ ;ϭϵϳϱͿ; E. “ŵith & J. DzieŶkoǁski, A Fifty Year Perspective on World Petroleum 
Arrangements, Ϯϰ  TEX. INT͛L L.J. 13 (1989) at 35-43. The phenomenon of State intervention is not limited to 
developing countries: see O. Mestad, The Acquisition of Natural Resources Interests by the State: The 
Norwegian Ekofisk Royalty Case, 2 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INV. L. J. 139 (1987). 
53
 R. MIKESELL, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINERAL INDUSTRY: CASE STUDIES OF 
INVESTOR-HOST COUNTRY RELATIONS (1973); id., FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MINING PROJECTS: CASE STUDIES 
OF RECENT EXPERIENCES (1983); see also Leo Kissam & Edmund Leach, Sovereign Expropriation of Property 
and Abrogation of Concession Agreements, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 177 (1959); Jean-Flavien Lalive, Unilateral 
Alteration or Abrogation by Either Party to a Contract Between a State and a Foreign National, in RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES OF PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 265 (1965). 
54
 Cf. Osita Eze, Legal Structures for the Resolution of International Problems in the Domain of Private Foreign 
Investments: A Third World Perspective Now and in the Future, ϵ GA. J. INT͛L & COMP. L. ϱϯϱ ;ϭϵϳϵͿ. 
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customary international law thus intensified.55 The ensuing debate raised 
considerable challenges for international law vis-à-vis its role in regulating 
international economic relations in general and the FDI process in the natural 
resources sector in particular – not least because of the new uncertainties over the 
precise status of relevant norms and principles. To both historians and publicists 
alike today‟s “clarion calls to roll back the international investment regime”,56 with 
Latin American countries at the forefront, will indeed sound like a familiar refrain. 
This fact per se underscores the importance of the historical perspective given the 
recurrent and cyclical nature of these events. It is, from a historical perspective, a 
cycle characterized by periods of latent calm often followed by bouts of intense 
conflict in the form of regulatory State intervention in ongoing projects and recourse 
by the FDI party to the international dispute settlement process. 
 
Amongst the challenges facing contemporary international law is still the 
quest for satisfactory solutions to the persistent legal problems posed by the 
phenomenon of State contracts with foreign nationals or companies (the substantive 
aspects of which falls to be governed by relevant principles of public international 
law). Also central to this quest is the desire to find effective ways in which host State 
commitments to investment regime stability (contained in legislation or contract 
terms) can be reconciled with the inherent public powers of national legislators to 
vary existing laws or promulgate new legislation in ways which impact on the post-
contractual framework of the FDI project.57 Hence the key question: what are the 
permissible limits of unilateral State action to alter established terms and conditions 
governing FDI agreements? Depending on which school of thought one ascribes to, 
the ambit of unilateral State intervention may either, (a) be very severely 
circumscribed by international law; or (b) the State retains a regulatory discretion in 
light of its sovereign and public power prerogatives. 
 
From a historical and political perspective two schools of thought have thus 
emerged from the debate on the constitutive legal process applying to natural 
resources development agreements. Of these schools, traditional international law 
thinking (which advocates the application of customary rules of international law to 
the international investment regime) has been criticized for being largely impervious 
to the hopes and aspirations of mineral-endowed developing countries for the 
founding of a new international economic and legal order;58 i.e. a new regime 
involving a re-ordering of the underlying philosophy and legal principles applying to 
international economic relations between overseas private investors and host States 
                                                          
55
 C.F. Amerasinghe, State Breaches of Contracts with Aliens and International Law, ϱϴ AM. J. INT͛L L. ϴϴϭ 
(1964); Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Multinational Enterprises and the International Law of the Future, 29 Y.B. 
WORLD AFFAIRS 567 (1975); Martin Domke, Foreign Nationalizations: Some Aspects of Contemporary 
International Law, ϱϱ AM. J. INT͛L L. ϱϴϱ ;ϭϵϲϭͿ.   
56
 Kaushal, supra note 5, at 495; and see generally, FRANCISCO PARRA, OIL POLITICS: A MODERN HISTORY OF 
PETROLEUM (2004). 
57
 Cf. M. ARSANJANI, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF INTERNAL RESOURCES: A STUDY IN LAW AND POLICY 
(1981); An Tang, The Law Applicable to Transnational Contracts, 21 J.W.T.L. 95 (1987). 
58
 S.K.B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal, ϯϳ INT͛L & COMP. L.Q. ϱϴϴ-628 
(1988); F.V. García-Amador, Current Attempts to Revise International Law: A Comparative Study, ϳϳ AM.J. INT͛L 
L. 286 (1983); N. Horn, Normative Problems of a New International Economic Order, 16 J.W.T.L. 338 (1982). 
These critics point to the fact that the emergence of peremptory norms  (jus cogens) purporting to govern 
investment relations in the natural resources sector has been matched only by perceived staticism on the part 
of traditional norms, the conceptual focus of which remains tilted in favour of FDI protection.   
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with a view to promoting sovereign ownership and control by the latter over domestic 
natural resources. Supporters of the putative new norms which have been proposed 
as a replacement for the traditional regime, on the other hand, are seen to 
appreciate less fully the need for FDI protection by not being sensitive to the 
requirement for the stability of essential investment conditions as a necessary pre-
requisite for the success of FDI ventures.59  
 
The debate itself has undoubtedly contributed a great deal to a much 
improved understanding of the legal problems of FDI. But a distorting side effect has 
been its political undertones.60 It is to be submitted that the sometimes formulaic 
orientations of scholarly discourse, especially in its articulation of the principle of 
compensation for injury caused to foreign investor interests, has rather tended to 
accentuate the North-South (or West-South) affiliations in doctrinal analyses.61 A 
review of literature on the subject seems to suggest that the conceptual focus has 
been tended to be directed more at the question of applicable standards and less on 
the functional aspects of reparation in foreign expropriation cases.62 This portrays a 
somewhat dogmatic approach which has only served to further obscure the applied 
and functional role of the compensation requirement within the international 
investment regime. It is perhaps for this reason that the historical and conceptual 
evolution of the international investment regime appears to have aspired primarily 
towards the promotion of one viewpoint or the other. Over time the theoretical 
expositions of each school of thought have thus become more inclined towards the 
selective positioning of posited norms, principles and legal standards.63 The post-
independence agitation by capital-importing nations for full national sovereignty over 
domestic natural endowments and the politicization of the debate on the constitutive 
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 Cf. R. Brown, Contract Stability in International Petroleum Operations, 29 THE C.T.C. REPORTER 56 (1990); A. 
Chiati, Protection of Investment in the Context of Petroleum Agreements, 204 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1987-IV). 
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at 133-36; Jorge Castañeda, La Charte des Droits et des Devoirs Économique des États: Note sur son Processus 
d͛ÉlaďoƌatioŶ, ϮϬ ANN. F‘ANÇAI“ D‘OIT INT͛L ϯϭ ;ϭϵϳϰͿ, at ϱϱ. 
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 See B. RÖLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED WORLD (1960), at 15; H. MOSLER, THE 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY (1980), at 3-6; and see generally Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, 
Le Règles Juridiques et le Conflit Nord-Sud, 33 Ö.Z.Ö.R.V.R. 199 (1982); Guha-Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of 
States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?, ϱϱ AM. J. INT͛L L. ϴϲϯ ;ϭϵϲϭͿ.  
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 See, however, C.F. Amerasinghe, The Quantum of Compensation for Nationalized Property, in R. LILLICH (ED), 
THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY 91 (1975); R. Wesley, Establishing Minimum Compensation 
Criteria for Use in Expropriation Disputes, 25 VAND. L. REV. 939 (1972); see further 4(6) TRANSNATIONAL 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2007): Special issue on Compensation, Damages and Valuation in International 
Investment Law. 
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 GEORGE NDI, INVESTMENT POLICY TRANSFORMATION IN THE NATURAL RESOURCES SECTOR: LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS AS REGARDS THE TENSION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN 
RIGHTS, PHD DISSERTATION, UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE (1994), at 7-15. 
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legal process governing the international investment regime at the United Nations 
General Assembly only served to further cloud what was already an uncertain 
landscape.64 This, in turn, has led to the perception amongst capital-exporting 
countries that ensuing UNGA resolutions on questions relating to natural resources 
development are of the character of political opinions with limited normative value.65  
 
It is thus evident that political factors have played a key role within the 
framework of the historic nexus and synergies between the international 
development of natural resources, FDI and international law.66 The doctrine of State 
responsibility is itself deeply rooted in the politics and diplomacy of international 
business transactions.67 The principle is undoubtedly an indispensable element of 
the international investment regime. The real question is whether it (and the 
international investment regime as a whole) is universally recognized as 
representing an authoritative and objective international standard of economic and 
social justice. In the course of time this basic question, on which depends the 
legitimacy of the rules of the international investment regime, has been the subject of 
conflicting views.68 As noted by one scholar “because of the existence and influence 
of extraneous factors which are not always compatible with the law, artificial 
principles and concepts have been evolved which often appear markedly 
incongruent”.69 These deep divisions in both political and scholarly opinions have 
been a key contributor to the tension which lies at the heart of the international 
investment regime. Emblematic of this tension is the dilemma between continuity 
and change (tradition versus innovation) which itself has become a central feature of 
the debate on the international regulation of FDI.70 Hence while capital-exporting 
nations advocate upholding the values of the current international investment 
regime, the capital-importing nations continue to nurse a historic grievance founded 
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on what some perceive to be the basic inequality of States in international law.71 This 
is a perception that will clearly need addressing if the international investment regime 
is to regain its universal authority and legitimacy. 
  
B.  Economic Context: The Pivotal Role of FDI in the Natural Resources Sector. 
 
FDI has traditionally played a prominent role in the development of natural 
resources. Private industry pioneered the birth of the oil industry in the United States 
and its subsequent expansion into an international industry with multinational 
corporations at the forefront. In developing countries the role of FDI has been an 
indispensable element, the conditio sine quo non, of the development of domestic 
natural resources.72 The basic characteristics and structure of the natural resources 
industries, in particular petroleum and mining, have often tended to favor a large 
scale, capital-intensive and multinational approach to conducting operations. These 
are attributes more suited to private enterprise. The distance between production 
sources and markets, the need for upstream to downstream vertical integration of 
operations, the complexity of market logistics and capital-intensiveness all imply both 
a multinational approach and a private sector risk and reward orientation.73 Yergin, in 
his book “The Prize”, makes the following observations: 
 
“[The petroleum industry] embodies the extremes of risk and reward, as well 
as the interplay and conflict … between private business and the nation-state. 
It also remains … an essential element in national power, a major factor in 
world economies, a critical focus for war and conflict, and a decisive force in 
international affairs.”74 
 
Driven by the spirit of entrepreneurship and founded predominantly on FDI, 
the global natural resources industry is a civilization which epitomizes the very 
essence of the market economy. Pre-dating the era of independence, the flow of FDI 
into the natural resources industries in resource-rich developing countries continued 
unabated after independence.  The absence of domestic enterprises and home-
grown entrepreneurs with the required capital resources, technological know-how 
and relevant managerial expertise meant continued reliance by the newly 
independent countries on FDI.75 The deficiency in capital accumulation rendered the 
financing of natural resources development projects in developing countries from 
internal sources negligible. Local involvement in the industry generally took the form 
of “sponsored” or symbolic equity participation by the State.76 Substantial public 
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sector financing by developing countries‟ governments, where applicable, took the 
form of either commercial or concessional loans, with equity financing of projects 
falling to the FDI party. The latter has particularly been the case for exploration 
activity for which loan finance is very rare (given its very high risk nature). The 
funding of exploration activity is still predominantly in the form of equity capital or 
„seed money‟ provided by portfolio investors attracted by the high risk/ high reward 
prospects of a big commercial find.77     
 
The natural resources sector in developing countries thus depends almost 
exclusively on FDI. The latest UNCTAD regional data indicates that FDI inflows into 
Africa reached a record level of $88billion in 2008 and that the main recipients were 
natural resources producers.78 Latin America registered an FDI growth rate of 13% in 
2008 to $144billion with natural resources development activities as one of the main 
attractions79, while in the same period West Asia (which includes the main oil 
producing nations of the Middle East) saw an increase of 16% in FDI to $90billion 
with significant inflows into the petroleum industries.80  
 
From both a contemporary and historical perspective the pivotal role of FDI in 
the sector is thus evident.81 It is for this reason that the international law regulating 
relationships between the host States and overseas private investors has been 
particularly relevant to the development of natural resources in developing countries. 
International law was called into play when in the period between the 1960s and 
early „80s there was a tendency towards public sector involvement and participation 
as developing nations sought means of exercising greater control over domestic 
natural endowments. During this period in the natural resources sector the following 
became the principal manifestations of the growing self-assertiveness on the part of 
host nations: renegotiation of the principal terms of existing agreements; direct State 
participation in resources ventures leading to the advent of State petroleum and 
mining companies; new and innovative forms of contractual and legal arrangements 
such as production sharing contracts, service or management contracts and joint 
ventures. More extreme manifestations of sovereign control, sometimes politically 
motivated, took the form of nationalization or expropriation. Their effects went well 
beyond their immediate impact on FDI, raising questions about the role of 
international investment regime as a regulatory tool. 
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These policies aimed at optimizing State involvement, control and ownership 
of domestic natural resources became the key indicators of progress on PSNR. The 
new concepts of PSNR, NIEO and CERDS provided the ideological basis for post-
colonial aspirations towards full political and sovereign control over natural resources 
development.82 At the center of these policies is interplay between FDI interests (in 
preserving managerial and operational control) and the aspirations of host States to 
exercise greater national control over resources development policy. As a 
consequence of this historic interaction, the sector has thus become the traditional 
battleground for playing out the conflict between private property rights and 
sovereign rights - with all its political, economic, cultural, nationalistic and 
international legal ramifications.83 
 
One of the visible results of public sector involvement in the natural resources 
sector in developing countries has been the emergence of State petroleum and 
mining companies.84 These became the principal vehicle for State involvement in 
petroleum and mining operations in the form of State participation, production 
sharing contracts, contractual or equity joint ventures or, in some cases outright 
nationalization.85 This trend led to a considerable reduction in the scope of FDI 
involvement in resources development in developing countries, particularly in the 
upstream sector where State participation became an indispensable measure of 
progress on PSNR. But despite this reduction in scope FDI in most cases remained 
the main direct source of financing for exploration and development activities while 
multinational resources companies remained the main providers of technical know-
how. The latter took the form of the “sponsorship” of State petroleum and mining 
enterprises on an exploration “carry through” basis or through the provision of 
technical expertise under management and service contracts.86 
 
Unfavorable economic conditions (starting with the economic recession in 
1980s) led to a policy reappraisal culminating once again in an enhanced role for FDI 
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in the development of natural resources in developing countries.87 FDI has assumed 
greater importance largely due to the constriction of financial resources available for 
exploration and development leading to the adoption of more liberal investment 
regimes by resource-rich but capital-poor developing countries. The importance of 
FDI to the international development of domestic natural resources thus remains 
evident. And equally important is the underlying question concerning the constitutive 
legal process for the resolution of FDI disputes in the natural resources sector. 
Before examining this question in depth, it is proposed first to critically inquire into 
the precise nature and legal character of natural resources development agreements 
in international law.    
 
 
III. KEY ASPECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 
AGREEMENTS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE FRICTION. 
 
A pre-requisite to a clearer understanding of the problems arising from the 
development of domestic natural resources in an international legal context lies in 
appreciating the importance of legal classification or characterization. This is in view 
of the profound implications of characterization for the international regulation of 
domestic natural resources development. The importance of characterization 
provides the rationale for a critical examination of the specific nature and character 
of such agreements from an international legal perspective. The analyses in this part 
will thus serve as the background to Part IV.  Informing the inquiry in both parts is the 
concept of an economic development agreement (“EDA”) in international economic 
law, its possible implications for the FDI regime and its role in the friction between 
international property rights and sovereign rights.88  
 
Natural resources development agreements belong to the generic category of 
“State contracts”89 - except perhaps for those agreements concluded under private 
mineral ownership regimes such as obtains in the USA, licensing regimes, service 
contracts, or agreements involving a State enterprise or agency as opposed to the 
State itself. This generic designation notwithstanding, the FDI petroleum or mineral 
developer will often opt for the choice of an “investment contract” as the preferred 
legal framework for the project agreement. This preference for a “contract” 
designation, coupled with a contractually formalized fiscal regime, is seen to import 
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into the relationship remedial principles such as the doctrine of sanctity of contract - 
thus ensuring for the investment project its legal security.90 It is, however, still the 
case that such agreements present particular problems with regard to their legal 
nature and character in international law.91 The majority of international agreements 
for the exploration and/or exploitation of natural resources exhibit a predominantly 
contractual form or traits pertaining to general commercial law. However, such 
agreements also manifest of a mixed private/ public law characteristics.92 It is this 
mixed dichotomous character which has rendered their precise legal classification an 
exercise fraught with considerable complexity and uncertainty. This in turn has given 
rise to a number of questions. Do such agreements belong to the category of 
„contractual arrangements‟ and hence governable by relevant private law principles 
of contract and commercial law? Can they rightly be treated as such for the purposes 
of protecting the vested or acquired rights of the investor? Or do such agreements 
belong to a special category of transactions which - while incorporating the essential 
elements of private contract law - transcend the boundaries between private and 
public law?93  
 
Informing these questions is the extent to which the State party 
(„internationalization‟ and stabilization clauses notwithstanding) can subsequently 
intervene to introduce unilateral changes to the agreement through the use of its 
public power prerogatives. A public law classification would be more permissive of 
the sovereign “right to regulate” by the State.94 A private law or contract 
classification, being less amenable to subsequent alteration of terms, is far more 
restrictive of unilateral intervention by the State. The latter classification in effect 
forecloses the possibility of regulatory measures by invoking remedial principles 
such as the doctrine of acquired rights, sanctity of contract and breach of contract 
principles.95  
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Before a critical enquiry into the categorization of natural resources 
development agreements can be attempted, a necessary pre-requisite is to identify 
the principal characteristics of such agreements. The analysis is informed by two 
main objectives: the first is to distinguish natural resources development ventures, 
from an international law perspective, from other international business and 
commercial transactions by identifying and analyzing their special features.96 The 
second is to assess the implications of these features for the question of FDI 
security.  
 
Natural resources development agreements involving the infusion of FDI 
exhibit the following main characteristics: 
    
 
A.  Form: Private-Public Character Dichotomy. 
 
From an international law perspective natural resources development projects 
are neither private law relationships (i.e. the contrats privés internationaux concept of 
French law) which fall to be governed by principles of private international law; nor 
are they public law transactions stricto sensu in the sense of inter-State agreements 
(contrats parfaitement internationaux).97 Rather, they mostly belong to a sui generis 
category of mixed private-public transactions. This private-public character 
dichotomy has been cited as one of the possible root causes for some of the 
conceptual difficulties and legal problems associated with the international regulation 
of domestic natural resources development.98 Dichotomy in this context denotes not 
a bifurcation or mutually exclusive tendencies, but the uneasy and often troubled co-
existence between private law and public law, national law and international law, and 
private property rights and sovereign rights within the framework of such 
agreements. This incongruence is often defined by tendency in the long term 
towards a compartmentalization of interests within the framework of the project – to 
wit, the national economic development objectives and aspirations of the host nation 
on the one hand and the pecuniary interests of the FDI party on the other.99 
„Dichotomy‟ also denotes the problems of characterization, and ultimately, the 
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permissible limits of the host State‟s regulatory competences within the post-
contractual framework of the FDI project.100 
 
The view that the root causes of the legal problems affecting the FDI regime 
could well lie in the hybrid character of FDI projects is given further credence by the 
fact that international arbitral and claims practice on the question seem so far to 
have been tentative and exploratory - with conflicting outcomes.101 In the case of BP 
Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic102, for 
example, the arbitral tribunal ruled that oil concessions under Libyan law (the 
applicable law) belonged to the category of public contracts known as administrative 
contracts. This outcome confirmed an earlier ruling in Sapphire International 
Petroleum v National Iranian Oil Company.103 The tribunal in Arab American Oil 
Company (ARAMCO) v Saudi Arabia104, however, took a different view in rejecting a 
„public law‟ characterization. Similarly, in Texaco/ Calasiatic v Government of 
Libya105, the public law characterization was rejected on the basis of the presence of 
a stabilization clause in the agreement.106 This last fact was construed as amounting 
to a negation of the “clauses exhorbitantes” concept of administrative law, therefore 
rendering the agreement repugnant to the concept, nature and spirit of a public law 
contract.107 Furthermore, in the LIAMCO arbitration,108  the tribunal ruled that 
although the oil concession agreement between LIAMCO and the Libyan 
government was of a mixed public-private (semi-public) legal character it still 
retained a predominantly contractual disposition.109     
 
On balance these cases appear to favor a „contract‟ classification for natural 
resources development agreements involving the infusion of FDI. It however remains 
a matter of considerable uncertainty whether such agreements can be treated in the 
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same way and applying the same legal principles as ordinary contracts between 
private individuals or companies. The very presence of a sovereign State as a party 
clearly confers on FDI agreements a very different complexion from that of ordinary 
contracts. International law aside, it may ultimately depend on the agreement terms, 
(or even the specific legal and formal requirements of the municipal legal system) as 
to whether a natural resources development venture is classified as a contract or a 
public law instrument. This in turn will depend on the bargaining dynamics between 
the host State and the FDI party. Host nations with a track record of proven reserves, 
investment security or even a fashionable geology may well be able to successfully 
negotiate a public law classification if faced across the bargaining table by an 
investor who is anxious or prepared to close a deal at all costs. But the vast majority 
of countries, many of them with risky exploration geology, will at the onset of 
negotiations be quite willing to offer a protective minerals investment environment to 
potential FDI partners in exchange for much needed exploration and development 
funding and expertise. These protective measures may include government 
guarantees of fiscal and legal regime stability, internationalization of the agreement 
by externalizing any subsequent dispute settlement process or a private contract law 
classification. The latter need not be explicitly stated. It could well be implied from 
references in the agreement to general principles contract and commercial law as 
the choice of applicable law.         
 
 
B.  The Role of the Parties and its Contribution to the Friction. 
 
The parties to natural resources development agreements, particularly of the 
traditional concession variety, have in most cases been the State (as the licensing 
authority110) and the FDI investor (usually a multinational petroleum or mining 
company). Increasingly, however, the demise of State participation and the advent of 
commercialization or privatization of State petroleum/ mining companies have seen a 
significant reduction in direct State involvement in the sector. Most host States 
however continue to retain a residual interest in the form of equity or contractual joint 
venture participation, or a regulatory interest in relation to licensing and supervision. 
 
From an international law perspective natural resources development projects 
thus differ significantly from other commercial transactions involving the State or a 
State agency and a foreign private party (such as a contract for the supply of goods). 
In the latter type of transaction the State or State entity involved is acting primarily 
and almost exclusively in a capacity de jure gestionis.  This is particularly the case in 
the modern era with its restrictive interpretations of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity vis-à-vis commercial transactions involving a State party or entity.111 As 
party to a natural resources development agreement, however, the State acts in both 
a de jure gestionis and de jure imperii capacity. This fact accentuates the semi-public 
character of the transaction. The State acts in a de jure imperii capacity, for instance, 
in view of its public powers vis-à-vis the licensing of exploration and development 
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activities, or when exercising its taxation and other regulatory competences in 
relation to such activities. It also acts „qua sovereign‟ when guaranteeing to the FDI 
party (under specific constitutional or legislative authority) the stability of essential 
contractual, legal, fiscal or other operating conditions.112 
 
It is thus by reason of the State party‟s status as a public authority that the 
FDI party will often seek to include in the agreement conflict resolution mechanisms 
such as a choice of law or forum clause with a view to conferring on the project 
agreement an “internationalized” status. This ensures the agreement‟s removal from 
the jurisdiction of the municipal legal system by placing it under the protective aegis 
of international law.113 The FDI party will usually request that any potential disputes 
are subject to international arbitration in a neutral forum.114 The ultimate aim is to 
ensure that judicial recourse in the event of such disputes does not turn out to be 
futile in view of possible political interference in the judicial process by the host 
State‟s government.  
 
These elaborate safeguards - by ultimately placing the relationship under the 
adjudicative competences of the international investment regime - would also seem 
to suggest that the State‟s de jure imperii competences are not restricted to the 
negotiating or contracting phase of such projects; their continuing presence and 
relevance to the long term functioning of the project is clearly a matter of concern to 
the FDI party. The host State‟s interests in maintaining regulatory discretion, it could 
be argued, militates against the FDI party‟s quest for regime stability. Over the 
project thus looms the long and lingering shadow cast by the political or sovereign 
risk of future regulatory intervention by the host State. The latter‟s status as a public 
authority is thus a potential source of tension within the relationship.  
 
C. The Perceived Objectives of Natural Resources Development Projects:  
A Conflict of Interests? 
 
Natural resources development agreements have as their primary objective 
the exploration, development and exploitation of a country‟s natural endowments 
with the perceived aim (at least from the host country‟s viewpoint) of promoting vital 
sectors of the economy as a means to achieving economic growth and prosperity. 
The contribution of the FDI party to this process takes the form of a substantial 
commitment of equity or loan capital and technological expertise to facilitate 
exploration and development. This is done in hope (or expectation) of realizing a 
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reasonable or substantial margin of return on investments. The entrepreneurial spirit 
remains the driving force behind such projects. The profit motive is thus implicit in its 
very conception. It therefore comes as a surprise that the preambles, memoranda of 
understanding, press releases and other recitals that often precede or accompany 
the project agreement always tend to give pride of place to the national development 
objectives (the potential or expected contribution of the project to achieving national 
economic progress) with hardly any recognition of the legitimate expectations of the 
project‟s sponsors, the FDI party.115 
  
The government, as the custodian of the economic and social well-being of 
the State and its citizens, clearly sees as the raison d‟être of the natural resources 
development project the promotion of national economic development goals and 
objectives. As such, it identifies with the project the realization of certain declared 
(and undeclared) public interests priorities, a view confirmed by the following dictum 
from the case of N.V Cabolent v National Iranian Oil Company: 
 
“[The] active responsibility and activity of the State in the economic field, 
especially to be seen in countries like Iran where the exploitation of natural 
resources is by far the most important source of revenue, is considered to be 
of … importance for the life and well-being of [the] country and people …”116 
 
The tribunal went on to state that the oil industry in Iran related clearly to the 
promotion of “the primordial economic and social interest of the State.”117 
 
It could thus be argued that the FDI partner, while pursuing interests of a 
pecuniary nature also acknowledges that in the process s/he is contributing (or is 
under a duty to contribute) to the host State‟s national economic development plans 
and objectives. Central to this contribution is an optimum and rational exploitation of 
the country‟s natural endowments. This is a fact which is evidently borne out by 
relevant instruments and appendices to natural resources development agreements: 
the preamble, memorandum of understanding, recitals and protocols. But such 
instruments, being in the main pre-contractual in their nature, could be argued not to 
have the same probative value as the actual terms and conditions of the project 
agreement. The lack of clear articulation on the FDI party‟s expected contribution to 
national development objectives, coupled with the absence of explicit recognition by 
the State party of the FDI party‟s pecuniary interests in the project in such 
instruments, could be a potential source of future difficulties. From the FDI party‟s 
perspective a stable regime is more conducive to the recovery of investments. The 
objective of the host State, on the other, centers on a desire to retain regulatory 
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discretion with a view to promoting national economic development policies. It is 
these conflicting objectives which continue to nourish and to sustain the friction in the 
international investment regime.   
 
   
D. The Time Aspect: A Critical Factor in the Equation. 
 
The time factor is undoubtedly of great importance to natural resources 
development projects which, by definition, are long term engagements.118 To the FDI 
party the extended duration of the agreement is a significant factor in as much as it 
provides the time frame and opportunity for capital amortization or the recovery of 
substantial investments and earning of profits. At the same time, however, the risk 
element which is an inherent factor in such projects is exacerbated by the long term 
nature of the commitment. It is for this reason that the FDI party will often seek from 
the State partner guarantees as to fiscal and legal regime stability of the project as a 
pre-condition for the long term commitment of required capital investments and 
technological resources.119 The aim is to ensure that the contractual equilibrium is 
not upset or otherwise disrupted through possible intervention by the State party - for 
example, through the promulgation of new legislation or the subsequent imposition of 
new fiscal, regulatory or other administrative and executive measures.120  
 
The FDI party‟s main concern thus revolves around detrimental exposure of the 
project agreement to the vagaries and vicissitudes of time. Viewed from this 
perspective, resort by the FDI party to the contractual technique of stabilization may 
yet prove to be of very limited functional value in shielding the project from the 
ravages of time.121 For it is very much debatable whether recourse to even the most 
robust “freezing” version of the clause as a protective shield can guarantee for the 
project complete freedom or immunity from a rough and sometimes unpleasant and 
troublesome passage. The much desired regime stability can certainly not be 
achieved by attempting to draft away or to hold back the unrelenting tide of history, 
or the unremitting and inexorable passage of time - with all its ramifications. On the 
State side the long term duration of the agreement makes it almost impossible that 
the relationship will not at some stage be subject to the influence or effect of 
regulatory or legislative intervention. This could be for reasons of public policy 
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objectives, change of government, or even the natural evolution of the general or 
specific legal regime which impinges on the framework of the project.  
 
The aggregation of these characteristic features of natural resources 
development agreements converge to inform the principles which apply to the 
international regulation of domestic natural resources. Before examining these 
principles in detail, a critical inquiry into the question of categorization will first be 
attempted.  
 
IV. PETROLEUM AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
A.  The Question of Categorization: A Critical Commentary. 
 
A preliminary but important aspect of any international litigation involving 
natural resources agreements involves the question of characterization or 
categorization. This procedural question, more familiar to scholars of the private 
international law or the conflict of laws than to their public international law 
counterparts, can have a pervasive influence on litigation outcomes. The rationale 
for categorization in international investment disputes resides in the private-public 
law dichotomous character of resources agreements. But categorization, far from 
being a defining process in this case, may sometimes have the undesired effect of 
compounding existing difficulties. 
 
Natural resources development agreements involving the infusion of FDI 
clearly belong to the general category of „State contracts‟. This generic classification, 
however, only signals the beginning of the categorization process, not its end. There 
are incidentally a great multitude and diversity of international agreements which 
may be referred to as „State contracts‟. Natural resources development agreements, 
being predominantly of a semi-public character, are thus formally categorized as 
economic development agreements (EDAs).122 The EDA designation holds true 
irrespective of the parties‟ selection of the specific form of an “investment contract” 
as the applicable arrangement or legal framework.123 
 
The EDA categorization implies a purposive (or perceived „functional‟) 
approach as opposed to a purely legal description - there being as yet no generally 
accepted or recognized legal definition of an EDA.124 The specific types of 
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agreements which fall under the EDA category are, however, clearly distinguishable. 
These include, in addition to natural resources development agreements, 
concessions for public works and public utilities (transport, water, energy, power 
supplies, telecommunications, etc.); agreements providing channels for technology 
transfer, turnkey projects and management contracts for public enterprises and 
socio-economic institutions (hospitals, educational programs, etc). Lord McNair has 
further outlined the following as the principal characteristics of EDAs: 
 
“(a) They are made between a government on the one side and on the other, 
a foreign corporation …; 
(b) They are normally contracts for some long term exploitation of natural 
resources …; 
(c) The rights created are not purely contractual but are more assimilated to 
rights of property; 
(d) They confer extensive incentives to foreign investors, such as complete 
freedom from export and import duties, exemption from taxation… [etc.]; 
(e) Many of these development agreements are governed partly by public law 
and partly by private law.”125 
 
Some of the key elements in Lord McNair‟s description are closely associated 
with the principal features of the traditional concession system. In interpreting these 
characteristics, therefore, due allowance ought to be made for the profound evolution 
which has since taken place in the industry with the emergence of new forms of 
agreements such as production sharing and service contracts. It could still be 
argued, however, that the EDA concept (being an all-embracing formula) has 
survived this evolution and thus applies to the new forms of agreements. 
 
Another perspective on the concept of an EDA is offered by the dicta from the 
arbitral award in LIAMCO126 in which the principal characteristics of an EDA were 
outlined as follows: 
 
“A contract of this type is a semi-public agreement made between a State and 
a private individual, the object of which covers a project of public utility or 
exploitation of certain natural resources and in which are defined the rights 
and obligations of the parties … 
 
Such a contract has special characteristics of which the most common are … 
special clauses concerning, inter alia, technical and financial provisions, use 
of exorbitant rights and privileges, the choice of the proper law of the contract, 
and a compulsory arbitration clause.”127 
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 Modern perceptions of natural resources development agreements differ 
significantly from the pre-PSNR era under which the concession categorization 
prevailed. The traditional concession agreement has been defined as “a licence 
granted by the State to a private individual or corporation to undertake works of a 
public character extending over a considerable period of time, and involving the 
investment of more or less large sums of capital.”128 A theoretical understanding of 
this definition offers little or no distinction between a mineral concession and an 
EDA. Viewed from a functional perspective, however, the essential differences 
between the two become apparent. To fully understand the nature of the distinction it 
is necessary to have further recourse to a more comprehensive definition of the term 
„concession‟. Fischer, after acknowledging the lack of consensus on the notion and 
uniform application of the term, offers the following view: 
 
“[A] concession in the wider sense may be defined as a synallagmatic act by 
which a State transfers the exercise of rights or functions proper to itself to a 
private person, State-owned enterprise or a consortium which, in turn, 
participates in the performance of public functions and thus gains a privileged 
position vis-à-vis other private law subjects within the jurisdiction of the State 
concerned.”129    
 
 A key aspect of the distinction between a concession and an EDA resides in 
the fact that the EDA categorization clearly expresses the notion of an „agreement‟ 
between the parties involved, the host State and the FDI party. The term 
“concession”, on the other hand, serves to obscure the essentially bilateral nature 
(and therefore the negotiated basis) of the relationship; the same applies even in 
cases where the mineral developer‟s rights emanate from the grant of an 
administrative instrument such as a mining permit or license.130 This fact is further 
emphasized by Nwogugu in whose view, “… as the use of [the term] „concession‟ 
implies in most cases a unilateral grant by the State, the new term [EDA] removes all 
doubts as the true relationship between the parties.”131  But of far more significance 
(from a perceived functional point of view) is the fact that the notion of an EDA 
highlights in a very explicit manner the expected contribution of the natural resources 
project to national economic development aspirations of the host State. This fact 
perhaps explains the prominence in post PSNR/ NIEO host States‟ policies of the 
prioritization of national economic development objectives. These include technology 
transfer, the professional training, employment and promotion of nationals within the 
framework of the project; and promotion of local enterprises through the sourcing of 
materials from domestic suppliers and contractors or sub-contractors. 
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The EDA concept thus implies at its core not just the unilateral or 
concessionary grant of mineral development rights; it denotes a bilateral 
engagement which is intended (or perhaps perceived by the host nation) to serve as 
a platform for national economic growth.132 The traditional concession-type 
agreement, on the other hand, is clearly marked by the absence of any aspirations 
towards national economic development goals and objectives or similar such 
expectations on the part of the host community. What, then, are the implications of 
the EDA categorization for the international regulation of natural resources 
development ventures? And is the EDA categorization supportable (in view of the 
continuing friction between international property rights and sovereign rights)? 
 
On closer examination it could be argued that the EDA categorization, when 
viewed from a development perspective, has limited functional value. Far from being 
a practical tool it is arguably a purposive or an aspirational model.  The apparent 
clarity of purpose vis-à-vis its expected contribution to national economic 
development objectives is hardly matched by the evolution of projects the ground. 
The continuing disaffection on the part of developing nations with the current 
international investment regime suggests that the EDA concept, well-intentioned 
though it may be, clearly makes for a rather poor developmental model. The end 
result is that it, like the traditional concession, has become an embodiment of the 
latent frictions and tensions which often culminate in unilateral (corrective) measures 
by the host State. A possible explanation lies perhaps in the misplaced emphasis 
vis-à-vis the role of the FDI partner as a harbinger of national economic 
development. It is neither feasible, nor indeed desirable, for the host State to 
„delegate‟ to the FDI party (be it within the framework of an EDA) national 
development goals and objectives. This is clearly a task which is as onerous as it is 
unattainable - if the desired objective is indeed to transform a private profit seeking, 
risk and reward oriented multinational company into either a transnational 
development agency or an altruistic benefactor. It is clearly for this reason that 
concerns have been raised over the perception of natural resources development 
agreements premised on the EDA concept; it is therefore hardly surprising that 
scholars have been critical of the use of the EDA designation as going too far the 
other way - in that developing nations could feel that the exploitation of their natural 
resources is only in their interests and the foreign investor is actually carrying on his 
enterprise as economic aid.133 
 
The economic development function ascribed to the FDI party under the EDA 
categorization is rendered even more onerous by the fact that the desired national 
economic development goals and objectives are themselves often ill-defined and 
unspecified. The more likely outcome is thus to generate unrealistic expectations in 
the host community. The interest of other key stakeholders (shareholders, investors, 
lenders, etc) and their legitimate expectations and overall corporate mission clearly 
lies in realizing the highest possible rate of return on their investments - not in 
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promoting the national development aspirations of the host community. These 
arguments are intended in any way to negate the significant contribution which FDI 
can make, directly and indirectly, towards the economic and social development of 
recipient communities. On critical reflection, however, it has to be submitted that the 
EDA designation (with its exaggerated and somewhat presumptuous emphasis on 
the economic development functions of FDI projects) has the potential to be 
transformed into a platform for conflict. This is particularly the case if, in the long run, 
the attainment of the desired national development objectives proves to be elusive. 
 
Doctrinal opinions remain divided on the question of the precise implications 
of the EDA categorization for the security of FDI within the context of the 
international investment regime. It would indeed appear that the notion of an EDA, 
with its developmental focus, implies a more expansive interpretation of the 
regulatory discretion of host States in exercising public power prerogatives. Some 
scholars, however, take a different view. Rather surprisingly, Pogany has posited the 
view that implicit in the notion of the EDA is an enhancement of legal protection for 
FDI in as much as the effect of the EDA categorization is to “internationalize” the 
contract; he thus argues that the ultimate effect is to isolate the project from the 
influence of national regulatory, legislative and judicial competences.134 He further 
posits that such “internationalization” (which is independent of the real or apparent 
intention of the parties as expressed in the choice of law provision in the agreement) 
serves to protect the investor in the same way as the stabilization clause which is 
directed more at precluding subsequent unilateral alteration of established terms and 
conditions by the host State.135  
 
The EDA categorization thus undoubtedly has significant implications for the 
security of FDI in the natural resources sector. The combined effect of a “public law” 
designation together with an EDA categorization is clearly to enhance the 
developmental function and public power prerogatives. The latter, it may be argued, 
thus becomes inherent in the very nature of natural resources development 
agreements. With this comes the possibility (or political risk) of subsequent 
regulatory intervention by the host State. A “private law” or contract categorization, 
on the other hand, implies the pre-eminence, and arguably the immutability, of the 
acquired rights of the FDI party within the framework of the agreement. This is not to 
say that in the event of a private law categorization the State‟s „right to regulate‟ is in 
effect extinguished; nor that in the event of an EDA categorization the State‟s right to 
regulate will be completely devoid of international law consequences. For 
international law prescribes a duty to pay prompt, adequate and effective 
recompense to the FDI party where such regulatory intervention is construed as 
amounting to a direct or indirect taking.  
 
This leaves the residual question as to how natural resources development 
agreements can best be categorized - given the above critique of the EDA concept. 
There is clearly a need to free the question of categorization from the EDA approach 
with its functional presumptions and developmental pretensions, from its grandiose 
but somewhat unrealistic expectations. However, an instinctive recourse to a wholly 
descriptive denomination such as „petroleum and mineral development agreement‟ 
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simply begs the question as to their precise legal category and the sources of 
applicable law. What is proposed here as a possible replacement for the somewhat 
outdated EDA concept is not intended at this stage to be a detail postulation but 
rather a preliminary sketch, with more substantive work anticipated in the future.   
 
One of the difficulties with the EDA concept stems from the fact that it aspires 
to be an all-inclusive categorization formula, a moniker for all FDI projects regardless 
of their legal form. In other words, it does not distinguish between contractual type 
agreements based on negotiated and project-specific terms and conditions, and 
more standardized regimes such involving permits and licensing. The latter clearly 
have a greater propensity towards public law, being in the main administrative 
instruments. It is posited that a differentiation between these two types is imperative 
to the question of categorization. What is thus required is a legal distinction based on 
two discrete categories.  
 
In the first group would be administrative type instruments (concessions, 
permits and licenses) drawn together under the category of economic cooperation 
agreements (“ECA”). Their proclivity towards public law would thus render the ECA 
concept more amenable to the exercise of public power prerogatives of the State, 
thus restricting the scope and effect of stabilization provisions. Given its character as 
an administrative instrument the ECA concept will be more permissive of the 
renegotiation and re-adjustment of terms and conditions, with national municipal law 
as the governing law. This will include judicial adaptation with a view to promoting 
the attainment of national economic development objectives – the latter being an 
implied obligation within the framework of the ECA. The second category, the 
economic partnership contract (“EPC”) would bring together contractual type 
agreements. At the heart of the EPC concept would be the notion of equality of 
status between the parties which derives from the negotiated basis of the agreement 
– i.e. a partnership of equals. Underlying the EPC model would be private contract 
law and international law principles such as sanctity of contract, pacta sunt servanda 
and the pervasive influence of stabilization provisions. Hence there will be lesser 
scope in the EPC for the exercise of public power prerogatives and minimal 
expectation (if any at all) from the FDI party vis-à-vis anticipated contributions to 
national economic development objectives. Within this new framework the EDA 
concept could well retain a residual role for the categorization of those agreements 
which straddle the boundary between the ECA and the EPC. 
 
 
B. The ‘Protective’ Function of Internationalization and Stabilization:  
A Critical Appraisal. 
 
From a drafting perspective, the submission of natural resources development 
agreements to governance by the international investment regime (including relevant 
principles of public international law), is often contractually achieved through the twin 
techniques of internationalization and stabilization. The combined effect of these 
techniques is to immunize, shield or otherwise isolate the minerals project from the 
effect or influences of the municipal legal system and from the regulatory 
competences of the host State. Internationalization, in a manner deemed perhaps to 
be consistent with the transnational character of natural resources development 
ventures, is itself usually achieved through the medium of a dispute settlement 
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provision such as a choice of law or forum clause in the agreement.136 Such 
provisions ensure that in the event of a dispute the range of applicable legal rules is 
not restricted to the municipal law of the host State.137 At their most effective, these 
techniques ensure that the whole of the dispute settlement process is externalized 
and thus falls outside the scope of any potentially applicable municipal legal rules.  
 
The intended effect of the stabilization clause is to complement the protective 
function of internationalization by “freezing” the municipal law of the host State and 
its application to the venture by reference to a prescribed date (usually the date of 
the signing of the agreement). Its objective is thus to shield the latter from any 
subsequent regulatory intervention by the host State.138 A fully-fledged study of the 
concepts of internationalization and stabilization is clearly beyond the remit of this 
article.139 Rather, what is proposed is to attempt an objective inquiry in the form of a 
critical appraisal of the protective function of both these techniques with a view to 
expounding their rationale, the problems associated with their use and the manner in 
which they impact on the tension between international property rights and sovereign 
rights.  
 
1. Internationalization: A Functional Analysis 
 
The internationalization of mineral development agreements can be achieved 
through the following ways140: 
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(a) Contractual stipulations regarding the choice of applicable law or forum, 
the main objective of which is to externalize the dispute settlement 
process; 
(b) Through the judicial process of categorization culminating in the selection 
of international law principles as the “proper law” of the agreement; 
(c) Through State practice vis-à-vis BITs; 
(d) By invoking relevant principles of customary international law on State 
responsibility and the protection of aliens and their property in the event of 
a dispute.    
 
The contractual techniques referred to in (a) above is often through the device of an 
express choice of law provision in the agreement.141 Stipulations as to the governing 
law vary widely and may be based on any one or more of the following: 
  Choice of national law of the host State: this has the attraction of appearing to 
be the „proper law‟ of the agreement, being its natural seat‟ or „centre of 
gravity‟ (i.e. the lex contractus or lex situs). However, concerns over its 
applicability include the fact that national constitutional provisions could raise 
doubts as to the amenability of either the agreement or the State party to 
municipal judicial processes or as to the arbitrability of any subsequent 
disputes under an arbitration clause.142 Secondly, even if the agreement is 
deemed amenable to judicial process or arbitrable, domestic  judicial 
construction in the form of a purposive interpretation of the EDA or „public 
contract‟ concepts (coupled with an expansive interpretation of developmental 
objectives or public interests prerogatives) could well frustrate any remedial 
recourse by the FDI party to the municipal legal system. It is in view of these 
concerns that the FDI party will often seek to internationalize the agreement 
by removing it from the scope and influence of the municipal legal system. 
  Choice of the national law of the home State of the FDI party: may have the 
attraction of being perhaps a well developed legal system with transparent 
and efficient processes and procedures, but could be deemed to be alien to 
the operational aspects of a project located in another jurisdiction. 
   Choice of national law of a third country: its key attraction lies in its perceived 
neutrality, but it could equally be deemed foreign and alien to the project. 
  A combination of two or more systems of national law, most likely that of the 
host State and the home State of the FDI party together with a third system of 
law. This may include principles of law common to the legal systems of both 
contracting parties together with general references to „good faith‟, „good will‟ 
or the general principles of (commercial) law. This somewhat exploratory, 
tentative and uncommitted approach to internationalization, far from achieving 
its desired objective, could well give rise to a „conflict of laws‟ scenario.  
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 Choice of public international law or the „general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations‟: this is a straightforward approach to internationalization 
of the applicable law. The term “civilized nations” was often used in the past to 
denote those nations whose legal systems were regarded as acceptable and 
suitable for arbitration. Although the term has now virtually disappeared from 
the lexicon of publicists it still retains a place amongst choice of law 
provisions.143 With the latter, it performs the dual function of seeming to 
provide a compromise on the question of the applicable law while at the same 
time seeking to distance the agreement‟s governing law from its natural point 
of reference – the host country or locus for the implementation of the project. 
 
With regard to State practice the main effect of BITs, from a remedial point of 
view, is the projection of FDI agreements onto the international legal plane. This 
process in turn confers on the FDI party locus standi in international fori through the 
acquisition of internationally justiciable rights under the BIT regime.144 On closer 
examination, however, a somewhat ironic consequence of this improvisational 
subjoining of protection (sought through the BIT mechanism for the FDI party) is an 
enhancement of the hybrid nature and semi-public character of FDI agreements. The 
end result is to distance the agreement still further away not just from the national 
legal system but, arguably, also from pervasive influence of private contract law 
principles. This in turn (depending on the outcomes of categorization) renders the 
agreement either more susceptible to governance by public law concepts at the 
national level, or by the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda following its projection onto 
the international legal plane. 
 
The process of internationalization is thus generally perceived to offer a 
protective function to the FDI party within the framework of the project agreement, in 
as much as internationalization provisions are conceived and designed to render the 
agreement less susceptible to subsequent unilateral State actions or domestic 
dispute settlement procedures. Elucidating on this point, Suratgar observes that the 
main “interest or motive of those who advocate [internationalization] is the desire to 
ensure against the possibility of [legal] effect being given to a termination or 
modification of the agreement … by an act of sovereign legislation.”145 
 
 The principal legal justification for this denial of effect to subsequent municipal 
processes and procedures would appear to be based on the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. According to Mann, following the internationalization of the agreement, “its 
existence and fate would be immune from an encroachment by a system of 
municipal law in exactly the same manner as … a treaty.”146 Some authors, in a 
similar vein, have identified as the intended objective of internationalization the 
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desire or aspiration by the FDI party to ensure for the project agreement a 
detachment or “escape” designed to ignore the impact of municipal law rules.147 
Viewed from another perspective, internationalization serves to reinforce the 
consensual element which is an inherent feature of the contractual process; it 
protects against unilateral modification to negotiated terms and conditions without 
the consent of the FDI party – i.e. by invoking international law consequences in the 
form of the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda and related principles.148 But one 
concern could be that perceived as such, the function of internationalization is to 
prioritize the interest of the FDI party (in the form of acquired rights) over any rival 
claims of the host State to exclusive domestic competence or public interest 
prerogatives – with the former claim founded on the premise of the lex loci sitae. 
Secondly, one of the effects of internationalization seems to be to fetter the 
administrative discretion of the host State vis-à-vis the project agreement. This could 
in turn have far-reaching domestic constitutional implications149 - hence exacerbating 
the friction between the rights of the investor to investment security and the host 
State‟s right to exercise regulatory discretion in pursuit of public interest objectives.   
 
 It is undoubtedly the case that the technique of internationalization, 
contractual or otherwise, provides some measure of comfort and protection to an FDI 
minerals investor who nurses apprehensions regarding any subsequent dispute 
settlement process falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal legal 
system of the host State. As an anticipatory mechanism for the resolution of FDI 
disputes (on the basis of a judicial process which is independent of the domestic 
institutions and politics of the host State) internationalization clearly performs a 
useful function as a risk management strategy. This it does through avoidance of the 
political risk of subsequent regulatory intervention by national authorities, any such 
intervention being subject to international law consequences. It also seeks to avoid 
the risk of possible political interference (leading to an absence of judicial 
impartiality) in the event of a project dispute.  
 
But when viewed from the perspective of the application of substantive 
principles of law the expected function of internationalization, which is to render a 
breach of the project agreement a breach of international law, is far less easily 
ascertained. This last expectation is that which has remained shrouded in 
uncertainty in view of the fact that (established customary international law principles 
notwithstanding) many host nations still rely on rival concepts such as PSNR as well 
as municipal legal and constitutional principles in disputes with FDI parties as seen 
recently in Bolivia and Venezuela.150  
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 A review of doctrinal analyses on the question of the validity and protective 
function of internationalization and of its impact on the relationship between property 
rights and sovereign rights reveals a rather mixed picture. Generally speaking 
doctrinal opinion seems to be split into three groups. In the first group are those 
scholars who advocate upholding the validity of internationalization based on the 
application of pacta sunt servanda.151 Amongst these is Weil who, in making the 
connection between internationalization and pacta sunt servanda, argues that the 
choice of internationalization has as its main effect the submission of the agreement 
to governance by public international law; in his view, this includes notably the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, in a manner as to render any breach by the State 
party in effect a breach of public international law.152 In the second group are those 
who hold out against both internationalization or “delocalization” and the application 
of the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.153 These scholars see in the unrestricted 
application of the latter doctrine an attempt at a possible derogation from the equally 
important principle of sovereignty.154 Bowett, for instance, has argued that pacta sunt 
servanda pertains exclusively to the law of treaties and has no obvious application to 
State contracts - even assuming the application to the latter of international norms.155 
Other writers, while recognizing the “international effects” of the delocalization 
process, still express some doubt as to the capacity of such protective endeavors to 
offer absolute protection.156 
 
 These differences in doctrinal opinions serve to illustrate the degree of 
conceptual uncertainty over applicable norms. This in itself is symptomatic of the 
fractious nature of the relationship between property rights and sovereign rights 
within the framework of natural resources projects and the international investment 
regime as a whole. From a historical perspective, the root cause of the problem lies 
not in the principle of applying international law per se to the FDI process, but rather 
in identifying and applying relevant sources of international norms to substantive 
obligations. One author succinctly puts the point thus: 
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“[Much] uncertainty exists as to the precise status of international norms… 
Until such time as a consensus can be achieved [regarding] the rules of 
international law applicable to relations between foreign investors and host 
States … the effectiveness of „internationalization‟ clauses is bound to remain 
uncertain. The difficulty is not that these clauses cannot perform the normal 
function of stipulations of applicable law, but rather that the substantive rules 
to which they apply is still in a state of flux.”157 
 
One of the unforeseen or undesired consequences of internationalization can 
thus clearly be seen in the conflict regarding the choice of applicable law - i.e. 
national law versus international law. This is a conflict that goes beyond one of 
governing law. Against the background of internationalization is the rivalry between 
the FDI party‟s desire for investment security and the regulatory impulses of the host 
State driven by the desire for sovereign control – to wit, the rivalry over ownership 
and control of resources.  
 
The use of the form of an „investment contract‟ (as opposed to an 
administrative grant or permit) together with the technique of internationalization 
often goes hand in hand with an attempt by the FDI party to “stabilize” the essential 
contractual, fiscal, legal and other operational conditions pertaining to the 
implementation phase of the project. This combination is intended to provide the 
investor with a comprehensive package of political risk management strategies.158 It 
is proposed next to appraise the effectiveness or otherwise of the stabilization 
strategy.    
    
 
 2. Stabilization Commitments: A Contextual Analysis 
 
 The stability of essential investment conditions (contractual, legislative, fiscal, 
regulatory and operational) constitutes one of the key components informing the 
security of FDI ventures.159 Fiscal and regulatory uncertainty appreciates to a 
considerable degree the political risk factor associated with long term mineral 
development ventures and will most likely act as a disincentive to the commitment of 
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significant resources required for minerals development.160 Stabilization thus serves 
a dual purpose. Its primary function is to protect and ensure the long term security of 
FDI.161 Secondly, governments with promising but undeveloped (or underdeveloped) 
mineral properties - or with attractive geological prospects - will often seek through 
stabilization clauses to extend guarantees of legal security to foreign investors.162 
Such guarantees may be inserted into mineral development agreements or be 
contained in relevant administrative orders, regulations or legislation.163 From a 
transactional viewpoint, stabilization thus serves the specific function of a „country 
risk management device‟ by seeking to lower the perception of political risk in the 
eyes of prospective „suitors‟.  
 
It is indeed the case that previous political risk events are often painfully 
inscribed not just in the personal memories of senior executives and managers, but 
also in the long term institutional/ historical memories of multinational corporations 
and investor home countries affected by such events.164 Stabilization guarantees 
thus provide a certain degree of psychological comfort, an anodyne prescription 
which serves to assuage and soothe the unpleasant memories of yesteryears. It is 
partly for this reason that countries, particularly those with indigent historical records 
of such events, will sometimes go to great lengths to try to reduce the perception of 
political risks (through commitments to regulatory restraint) as part of an overall 
investment promotion strategy.  
 
Much has already been written on stabilization clauses and their role in the 
international investment regime.165 It is therefore proposed to limit the analysis in this 
section to a review of the practice of stabilization within the thematic context of the 
conflict between international property rights and sovereign rights. Whatever form 
they take government guarantees (of regulatory abstention, administrative restraint 
or fiscal stability) to foreign investors are perceived to serve a specific risk 
management function. This can be either through their preventative (in warding off 
the sovereign risk of regulatory uncertainty by rendering the project agreement 
immune from subsequent municipal law rules or lex posterior), or anticipatory roles. 
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In the latter function, provision is often made for compensation in the event that the 
FDI party suffers additional financial burdens as a consequence of project specific 
post-contractual regulation or other ensuing general regulatory measures.166  
 
It is, however, in their preventative role that stabilization provisions are better 
known. In this role they serve as an expression of the long term contractual 
equilibrium, the latter being a pre-condition to facilitating the funding requirements of 
mineral development ventures. It is for this reason that companies embarking on 
transnational petroleum and mining ventures will tend to seek clarity, precision and 
some degree of predictability as to their legal rights, entitlements and obligations 
under the project agreement.167 The specificity (and stability) of terms facilitates the 
design of financial requirements which may involve the raising of project loans and 
the long term servicing of debt incurred through such loans.168 Fiscal certainty in 
particular constitutes a key component in the design of financial analysis models 
informing the mechanics of project implementation – i.e. the forecasting of costs, 
expected cash flows and income projection, tax liabilities, capital amortization, etc. 
Fiscal certainty likewise constitutes a pre-requisite for the extension of credit lines by 
financiers towards project loans/finance. 
 
Against this backdrop, political and institutional instability, as well as the ever 
present possibility of regulatory intrusion, could all entail significant adverse 
implications not just for project revenues but also for the security of title and rights to 
mineral property. The host State government of the day may, for instance, develop 
second thoughts about specific terms and conditions contained in the agreement 
after a substantial outlay of investment has been already committed by the company 
or following a significant discovery of a mineral deposit. Under these conditions 
bargaining power is known to shift considerably in favor of the host State. The latter 
could then seek to exploit its newly found leverage on the grounds of a (perceived) 
change of circumstances.169 The government may, for example, demand an 
increased share of the mineral rent if the economics of the project turn out to be far 
more favorable than was originally forecast by the financial models and economic 
projections on which the initial negotiations were based.170 In this eventuality, public 
and government opinion may become amenable to the influences of new and 
innovative forms of taxation of the project or even some form of direct State 
participation.171 As observed by Wälde & Ndi, in these circumstances the well known 
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concept of the “obsolescing bargain” tends to appreciate quite considerably the 
“hostage effect of sunken investment” in the form of funds irretrievably committed to 
the project by the FDI party on the basis of negotiated terms and conditions.172 The 
merits of specific economic arguments aside, political and regulatory pressures have 
thus become a quite familiar facet of the bargaining dynamics of transnational 
mineral development ventures. Political, fiscal and regulatory uncertainty clearly 
distorts the risk-reward equation. The containment of this uncertainty through the 
technique of stabilization could, however, in itself lead to long term friction as 
regulatory pressures build up over time. 
 
Given this environment of regulatory uncertainty and unpredictability the 
stabilization clause, by seeking to regulate the pattern of future government conduct 
vis-à-vis the mineral investment project, thus complements the form of an investment 
contract as the preferred legal arrangement in managing the political risks of mineral 
development ventures.173 The consensual and negotiated basis of the contractual 
relationship (as opposed to the alternative of an administrative instrument) is seen to 
render it less amenable to the influences of administrative fiat with any subsequent 
alteration of terms and conditions being subject to the mutual consent of both 
parties. There is, therefore, a key argument to be posited for upholding the validity 
and enforcement of stabilization provisions: by their conferring on the project 
agreement a greater degree of transparency and clarity regarding the pre-
determined legal obligations of the parties, there should thus be a case for upholding 
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the greater degree of expectation and reliance which the FDI party attaches to the 
negotiated terms and conditions. 
 
How, then, does the stabilization clause impact on the tension between 
international property rights and sovereign rights within the context of the 
international regulation of natural resources development projects? According 
Delaume, the purpose of stabilization is “to reach a compromise between the 
sovereign prerogatives of the State involved and the legitimate quest of the private 
party for stability of status consistent with sound business judgment.”174 Lalive, on 
the other hand, holds the opinion that the primary and fundamental purpose of the 
clause is to protect the foreign operator.175 Whatever its true function may be, what is 
clearly the case is that the presence of the stabilization clause alongside public 
interest considerations within the framework of mineral development agreements can 
accentuate the underlying tensions between the sovereign prerogatives of the State 
and property rights of the FDI party. For a (new) government intending to restructure 
the post-contractual regime with a view to promoting national economic development 
objectives, the stabilization clause looms as an impassable barrier on the path to 
attaining such ambitions. Over the long term the government‟s frustrated aspirations 
could well serve as a catalyst for friction and conflict in the relationship.   
 
Such tensions can become even more acute in municipal legal systems in 
which the mineral development venture acquires a distinctly public law character. 
Such is the case, for example, of the French administrative law system (and French-
inspired municipal law systems in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America) where 
the venture acquires the character of a “convention d‟etablissement”.  Under such 
systems the „classical‟ private law notion of a mineral development agreement as a 
contractual relationship inter partes (or contract simpliciter176) becomes substantially 
depreciated. This is in view of the fact that the project is perceived to acquire a 
socio-economic relevance and development function, thus becoming an instrument 
of national economic strategy and public policy.177 This in turn substantially qualifies 
the consensual element in the agreement thus giving the public power prerogatives 
of the State an enhanced status and pre-eminence within the relationship.178 The 
question then arises as to the validity, protective function and effectiveness of the 
stabilization clause vis-à-vis its relationship with the concept of State sovereignty.   
 
Scholarly opinion remains very much divided on the question of the validity of 
the stabilization clause in international law.179 Some authors uphold the „international 
legal effect‟ of such clauses by positing the view that breach of the stabilization 
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provision is itself an act illicit by its very nature – i.e. without the further requirement 
for the State involved to be in breach of customary international law.180 In the 
opposing camp are scholars who perceive in such clauses an attempt to fetter the 
public powers of the host State. These scholars argue that such an attempt would 
constitute a possible derogation from the principle of sovereignty both under national 
and international law.181 The judgments of international arbitral and claims tribunals, 
on the other hand, remain divided on the question.182 What is clearly evident is that 
one of the undesired effects of stabilization clauses may well be to heighten already 
incipient tensions within the framework of the project agreement. The long term 
effect could thus be to compromise the very protection which is sought from the 
clause, ultimately leading to open conflict between the acquired rights of the FDI 
party and the sovereign right of the host State to regulate. 
 
It would be somewhat precipitous to conclude this section without drawing 
attention to the so-called „suicide‟ clause.183 These clauses confer on the FDI 
petroleum or mineral developer the right to invoke a full scale take-over of the project 
by the host State in return for agreed compensation. Such would be the case if, in 
the view of the former, the cumulative effect of successive State interventions had 
reached an extent deemed to be unsustainable; or if a particular regulatory exercise 
was deemed to be insupportable or insufferable by virtue of it being an unjustified 
intrusion by the State. „Suicide‟ provisions (a kind of „consensual deprivation‟) can be 
said to occupy the opposite end of the spectrum to stabilization clauses. Unique and 
enigmatic in their own way, they continue to arouse a curiosity amongst scholars 
which remains to be fully satisfied. 
 
 
V. THE SOVEREIGN ‘RIGHT TO REGULATE’ AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
DOCTRINE OF ACQUIRED RIGHTS 
 
The ongoing friction in the international investment regime between the 
property rights of the investor and the sovereign rights of host countries stems 
largely from the fact these apparently conflicting values combine to form part of the 
same international legal order.184 The root cause of this, as already seen, may well 
reside in the private-public dichotomous character of FDI ventures. Contractual 
practice relating to internationalization and stabilization, and State practice on BITs 
may be said to be contributory factors to this tension.185 In this Part the main features 
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at the centre of the tension will be analyzed together with their principal 
manifestations. The Part concludes by exploring a possible way forward for the 
international regulation of FDI.  
 
 
A. The ‘Public Power Prerogative’: A Critical Reassessment. 
 
The EDA categorization notwithstanding, it could still be argued that natural 
resources development ventures remain in essence contractual relationships inter 
partes; at the very least such agreements retain a residual contractual disposition.186 
When viewed from this perspective the notion of unilaterally exercising public power 
prerogatives within the framework of the agreement appears in principle to be 
incompatible with the consensual element which is an inherent feature of a 
contractual agreement. Propositions in favor of unilateral State intervention are not 
only inconsistent with the private contract law concept of consensus ad idem; they 
also go against the grain of mainstream international legal thought, a considerable 
amount of intellectual capital having already been invested in promoting the concept 
of acquired rights.187 Viewed from a different perspective, however, opposition to the 
idea of the State‟s unilateral exercise of public powers may be tempered by the 
established fact that FDI agreements in general (and petroleum and mineral 
development ventures in particular) exhibit certain traits and particularities which 
clearly sets them apart from private law contracts.188 It is on this premise that the 
EDA categorization was originally conceived and based. And it has indeed been 
posited that the EDA categorization would automatically render applicable to the FDI 
investor the protection of the principles of international law “quite independently of 
the intention of the parties as manifested in the choice of law clause.”189 It could thus 
be argued that the combined effect of the EDA categorization and of such 
„automated internationalization‟ is to depreciate to a considerable degree the 
consensual element in the agreement.  
 
The rationale for automatic internationalization relies on the fact that the EDA 
concept is deeply rooted in the international legal system. It has thus been argued 
that the concept has the effect of removing the relationship from the domain of 
municipal contract law and placing it under the aegis of international law; or that it 
would at the very least render international law to be applicable in part to the 
agreement.190 But this raises the question as to the necessity of internationalizing the 
relationship through an EDA construction in order to secure international law 
protection for the FDI party - given that the customary international law principles of 
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State responsibility and the diplomatic protection of aliens and their property already 
serves the latter purpose. The answer to this question could well lie in the 
subsumption of contractual rights under the broader category of acquired/ property 
rights by virtue of the EDA categorization. But it could be argued (given the 
orientation and focus of the EDA concept on national development objectives) that 
the EDA categorization attracts not just international law protection for the FDI party 
but also the overriding public interests prerogatives of the State. Viewed from this 
perspective the public power prerogatives of the host State thus become an inherent 
feature of the project agreement.191 These powers exist mainly as a result of the 
public interests priorities which can be said to be present in natural resources 
development projects.192 Riad, for instance, has observed  these inherent public 
powers “exist … not only with regard to concessions in the classical sense, but also 
in relation [to] all modern types of contracts concerning the development and 
exploitation of certain natural resources which are by definition within the State‟s 
public [and regulatory] power.”193 Hyde further posits the view that unilateral 
intervention in such agreements by the State is as much a matter of right as of 
power.194 
 
Such public powers are widely recognized under various municipal legal 
systems. In England, Jamaica and Norway, for example, the exercise of such public 
powers is well established on the basis of domestic constitutional law principles 
reinforced by judicial precedents.195 Under the French administrative law system and 
other French-inspired municipal legal systems of African and Middle Eastern 
countries public interest considerations may sometimes require the presence in 
public contracts (such as mineral development agreements) of what is known as “les 
clauses exhorbitantes de droit commun.”196 These provisions, although specifically 
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included and not subsequently imposed unilaterally, typically confer on the State 
wide ranging powers of intervention in the functioning of the project. This fact serves 
as further confirmation, from the perspective of the municipal legal system, that the 
public interest prescribes the relevance of the State‟s public powers to the 
functioning of a public contract or contrat administratif.197 It is on this premise that 
Riad further argues that “…the public power is omnipresent and constitutes a 
predominant factor by the very nature of the „Development Agreement‟ from the first 
day of its conclusion and throughout its entire duration. This reality is clearly 
reflected in the French terminology of the „convention d‟etablissement‟”.198  
 
The contrat administratif concept involves not only a departure from the 
common law approach with its principal focus on consensus ad idem and the 
sanctity of contract doctrine. It also foretells of the ensuing friction and possible 
conflict once the agreement is projected on to the international legal plane through 
the application of the doctrines pacta sunt servanda and State responsibility. The 
principal effect of applying municipal public law principles is that the FDI agreement 
is perceived to acquire a socio-economic relevance to the national development 
objectives and aspirations of the host nation, hence aligning itself with the underlying 
philosophy which informs the EDA concept. The project agreement thus becomes a 
possible instrument for orchestrating strategic economic planning as well as a 
mechanism for articulating and implementing public policy. The increased emphasis 
which has been placed on the national development aspects of such agreements in 
the post-PSNR/NIEO era has only served to further nourish and sustain this „public 
law‟ conception of natural resources development projects. But once this public law 
approach is brought into play alongside established principles of customary 
international law as part of the same international legal order, the international 
investment regime becomes transformed into the principal fault-line of the tension 
between sovereign rights and international property rights. It also becomes an 
embodiment of the conflict between the prescriptions of customary international law 
and the aspirations and expectations of the municipal legal, administrative and 
political system. 
 
The distinctive characteristic of the current EDA categorization thus lies in the 
fact that the host State is „sovereign‟ and has a duty to promote and to protect the 
public interests. This public law quality presupposes that in the event of a conflict of 
interests within the framework of the project agreement (between the community 
interests and the private interests of the FDI party) the former should in most cases 
prevail. Such a hypothesis, if indeed it holds true, leaves ample scope for the 
subsequent and unilateral exercise of regulatory powers by the host State.199 
Doctrinal opinion, however, is not in agreement on this issue.  Some commentators 
see in the EDA categorization a confirmation of the public character of the 
agreement consistent with the concepts of public powers and exclusive domestic 
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regulatory competence.200 Others, on the contrary, have interpreted the EDA 
categorization as an indication of the international law protection to which the FDI 
party is entitled.201  
 
At the heart of the problem lies the need to balance the legitimate interests 
and expectations of the FDI party and the equally legitimate aspirations of the host 
State. The former will, in most cases, call for the maintenance of the „contractual 
equilibrium‟ for the extended duration of the agreement. The latter, on the other 
hand, requires the preservation of the regulatory option. Customary international law 
indeed recognizes the host State‟s right to regulate; but only if it is in the public 
interest, non-discriminatory and subject to the payment of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation where the intervention qualifies as a direct or indirect taking 
of alien property interests.202 The real question is whether these conditions are 
couched in such stringent terms as to amount to a deterrent against the recognized 
of host States right to regulate. It could well be argued that the Hull compensation 
formula in particular (with its market value orientations) serves more of a deterrent 
than a remedial function - especially for poorer nations which can scarcely afford the 
customary international law „market price‟ of the „right to regulate‟.   
 
The different and sometimes conflicting requirements of the FDI party and the 
host State within the framework of the project agreement highlights once more the 
private-public dichotomous character of such agreements. This hybrid character 
clearly has the effect of accentuating the difficulties of delineating a clear boundary 
between the private law (contractual) and the public law (regulatory) aspects of the 
relationship. The injection of international law into the mixture, far from providing a 
solution, only further compounds the difficulties.  At the heart of the regime requiring 
a minimum international law standard of protection for FDI thus lie the tension 
between international property rights and sovereign rights. 
 
  
B. International Property Rights versus Sovereign Rights:  
At the Heart of the Friction in the FDI Regime. 
 
 The conflict in the international investment regime between the private 
property rights of FDI party and the sovereign rights of host States has been most 
acutely played out in the petroleum and mineral sectors.203 Sovereignty is one of the 
principal indicia of statehood.204 From a legal perspective sovereignty denotes the 
legal personality of the State.205 In practice the exercise of sovereignty by the State 
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gives rise to general powers of governance within its territory, including the power to 
legislate and other public power competences. These powers of „imperium‟ confer on 
the government the capacity to conduct international relations - politically within the 
international community of nations and also commercially with private foreign 
concerns. The relationship between the concept of sovereignty and the principle of 
State responsibility appears at face value to be rather simple and uncomplicated: 
customary international law prescribes that the exercise of sovereignty must be in 
conformity with established principles governing, inter alia, the rights, duties and 
international responsibility of States. Thus the exercise of sovereignty in any manner 
deemed to be inconsistent with prior established legal obligations would normally 
engage the international responsibility of the State involved for any ensuing damage 
or loss caused to another State or to aliens and their property. On closer 
examination, however, this appearance of simplicity proves to be somewhat 
deceptive.206 
 
As already seen, the difficulty arises firstly from the conception of an 
international legal order which embraces principles promoting both the international 
property rights of private investors and the sovereign rights of States.207 The second 
difficulty arises from the assimilation of private contract law rules and concepts 
governing private rights to the principles of public international law governing, inter 
alia, State responsibility. The evolutionary development of customary international 
law has also seen the subsuming of intangible contractual rights into the broader 
category of tangible property or acquired rights. This process has in turn provided 
the rationale for the customary international law principles on FDI protection. The 
final piece in the jigsaw has been the assimilation of host State regulatory 
interference with the contractual (or property) rights of the FDI party to an 
international tort or delict.208 With the public power prerogative being an exercise of 
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the very sovereignty which forms part of the same international legal order as the 
property rights of aliens, the international investment regime has thus become the 
embodiment of incipient friction and tensions between international property rights 
and sovereign rights. 
 
At the heart of the conflict between these rights is thus the recognized and 
established power of the State, on the one hand, to regulate property, investments 
and other transactions within its national territory and under its direct jurisdictional 
competence. On the other hand, there is the need to protect foreign investors from 
the possibility of the arbitrary exercise of the powers of imperium in a manner which 
is likely to have significant adverse consequences for the investor‟s acquired rights. 
The ever increasing volume of international arbitral and claims practice on 
investment disputes between host States and FDI parties bears witness not just to 
the internationalization of FDI agreements. The international arbitration process also 
provides ample testimony to this tension by serving a catalogue or repository for this 
fundamental conflict at the heart of the international investment regime.  
 
A further complication arises from the dual role of the State as a party to the 
agreement and as regulator. It is in the latter role that the State (as custodian of the 
national patrimony) enjoys an imperium in the form of extensive legislative, 
executive, administrative and judicial competences. This empowers it to regulate, 
qua sovereign, essentially commercial relationships in a capacity de jure imperii.  
The same applies to a purely de jure gestionis relationship between the FDI party 
and a State petroleum or mining enterprise (or other State agency) in the form of a 
joint venture, participation agreement or similar arrangements. One consequence of 
this dual role of the State is that the consensual aspect of the relationship becomes 
so substantially qualified and the public power prerogatives acquire such a pre-
eminence as to suggest a basic inequality in the relationship.209 The question thus 
arises as to the degree of objectivity and impartiality vis-à-vis the government‟s role 
as a regulator.  
 
From the FDI party‟s perspective there is always the concern that the 
government, when regulating the relationship ex-contractually, may be tempted to tilt 
the balance in it‟s (or its agent‟s) favor. This necessitates on the part of the FDI party 
an instinctive recourse to political risk management strategies such as 
internationalization and stabilization.210 The government, however, would in most 
cases (often subsequent to the conclusion of the contract) be concerned to maintain 
its sovereign prerogatives and to retain the option to exercise them in pursuit of the 
national interests. The long term effect of stabilization could well be an accumulation 
of regulatory pressures which ultimately culminates in more pervasive and wider 
ranging regulatory measures, including nationalization. This may be the case, for 
example, where there is a perception on the part of the government that the general 
effect of stabilization in the past has been to forestall legitimate State intervention. It 
is against this background of the State‟s dual role as participant and regulator, and of 
the friction between international property rights and sovereign rights, that the 
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probative value of the stabilization clause as a protective mechanism is thus called 
into question.211  
 
When unilateral intervention in the functioning of the project agreement by the 
host State does ensue, it falls primarily to international law to allocate responsibility 
and in the process to give effect to the contractual or property rights of the FDI party 
which are judged to have been violated through such intervention.212 Once projected 
on to the international legal plane the conflict between international property rights 
and sovereign rights is transformed into a new contest as competing (and often 
conflicting) principles of the international legal order vie for supremacy in the 
prioritization of norms to govern the dispute: national law versus international law; 
established principles of customary international law versus peremptory norms jus 
cogens (PSNR, NIEO and CERDS); and private contract law versus public law 
principles of constitutional and administrative law. It is thus still a matter of conjecture 
as to whether the principal features of the constitutive legal process of the current 
international investment regime are capable of reconciling the conflicting 
requirements and claims of capital-importing countries and those of foreign investors 
backed by the capital-exporting nations; or if indeed the current regime has the 
capacity to find adequate, effective and long term solutions to the disputes which 
ensue from this tension.    
 
  How then can the current international investment regime be assessed, from 
a normative point of view, given this tension between international property rights 
and sovereign rights? This section thus concludes with an observation on the 
principal evolutionary features of the current regime. It is indeed axiomatic that over 
the years the doctrine of acquired rights has been heavily fortified by various 
doctrinal and contractual ramparts - to wit,  the customary international law principles 
of State responsibility and the diplomatic protection of aliens and their property (with 
the Hull remedial formula as its flagship); the doctrine of State succession; reliance 
and expectation contract theories expressed through the doctrines of pacta sunt 
servanda and sanctity of contract (and their expansive interpretation in international 
arbitral and claims practice);213 and the contractual techniques of internationalization 
and stabilization.214 This protective canopy afforded to the foreign investor has been 
further shored up by contemporary State practice in the form of the proliferation of 
BITs in the modern era.215 Assembled together, these principles present a 
formidable armory of legal weaponry which an aggrieved international petroleum or 
minerals investor can readily press into service in defense of entitlement to the 
protection of acquired rights derived under the natural resources development 
agreement. Indeed, it could further be argued that the advent and brief sojourn, 
followed by a somewhat hasty and unscheduled retreat, of postulated new norms of 
the international investment regime in the form of PSNR and NIEO confer on the 
current regime a distinctly traditional hue. This last fact - coupled with the very limited 
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and restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus within the 
context of international investment agreements216 - bears ample testimony to the 
deep entrenchment and resilience of the customary international law foundations of 
the current international investment regime.  
 
 
C. A ‘Lex Specialis’ for the International Investment Regime? Some 
Preliminary Thoughts. 
 
International investment agreements are in effect quasi-international 
agreements and therefore do not fit wholly into any standard category.217 Public 
international law, on the other hand, constitutes ius inter gentes (law between 
nations). This in part explains the unease and misgivings concerning an FDI regime 
based primarily on principles of customary international law. Drawing from various 
sources, one of the principal features of the current FDI regime resides in the fact 
that it does not constitute a uniform or homogenous corpus juris. It may thus be 
posited that uniformity, consistency, universal recognition and legitimization are the 
key pre-requisites for the international investment regime of the future. But are these 
features attainable? And if so how? 
 
One criticism of the current regime stems from what some writers see as the 
projection of the concept of reparation as the paramount feature of the doctrine of 
State responsibility.218 Revisionist scholars, many of whom perceived a new role for 
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international law in the post-colonial context, thus argued that since national 
economic development objectives have become widely accepted as a key feature of 
the international investment regime, there ought to be a more progressive 
conception of the doctrine of State responsibility. In other words, in the event of a 
conflict between competing principles, rules which facilitate development should be 
prioritized and accorded preference over those of a more rigid and circumscriptive 
disposition.219 The chief premise for these arguments seems to rest on the 
perception that the foundations of the traditional conception of the FDI regime has 
been undermined and eroded by modern trends in the political economy of 
international economic relations as encapsulated in the EDA, PSNR and NIEO 
concepts.220 But these claims are not undisputed. Some scholars, writing much 
earlier, had already asserted that international responsibility amounts to a basic duty 
of the State to eliminate the consequences of an unlawful act through the principle of 
reparation;221 this is regardless of any other claims made on international law, 
including the aspirations of capital-importing countries to development. 
 
In the light of these opposing views a possible sui generis corpus juris in the 
form of a lex specialis for the international investment regime thus becomes an 
increasingly attractive proposition, if not an imperative.222 Academic discourse on a 
possible lex mercatoria has generally tended to focus on transnational commercial 
contracts and applicable arbitration rules. The lex mercatoria or “new law merchant” 
has indeed been a prominent feature in academic discourse on transnational 
commercial contracts over the past four decades.223 But the concept of a „third legal 
order‟ applying to State contracts has also been muted in arbitral awards and 
scholarly discourse with specific reference to the FDI regime.224  In the TOPCO 
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award, for instance, Arbitrator Dupuy was of the view that “…contracts between 
States and private persons can, under certain conditions, come within the ambit of a 
particular and new branch of international law: the international law of contract.”225 
This third legal order, formless and inchoate in its present state, is not a legal system 
in its own right but will require time for normative growth, development and evolution. 
This is unlike the lex mercatoria which many scholars assert already exists.226  
 
But is a new international legal order for natural resources development 
agreements (and FDI as a whole) a viable proposition? What obstacles stand in the 
way of the founding of such an order? Before commenting on the specific nature of 
the lex specialis, it is proposed first to identify the possible problems which may be 
encountered as part of the institutionalization of such a system.  It has to be said that 
the obstacles which present themselves in the way of the development of a lex 
specialis for the FDI regime are indeed quite considerable, if not formidable. But they 
are not necessarily insurmountable. The first problem is surely that of gaining 
universal recognition. On this depends the pivotal question of legitimization. In a 
survey, for instance, of over 400 governing law provisions included in transnational 
commercial and investment contracts between the years 1987 and 1989, not a single 
one selected the lex mercatoria as the governing law.227 This is rather surprising 
given the ubiquitous presence of the concept in scholarly writings on the law 
applicable to transnational commercial contracts.228 Secondly, the proposed lex 
specialis (like its counterpart the lex mercatoria) may itself suffer at first from a 
number of deficiencies. In addition to the initial problem of attracting universal 
recognition and hence legitimacy, there may well be concerns over its perceived 
generality, vagueness, imprecision, incompleteness and perhaps its 
unpredictability229 – i.e. similar concerns to those expressed in relation to the lex 
mercatoria for transnational commercial contracts.230 Amongst some of the reasons 
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advanced for the non-application of the lex mercatoria in arbitral awards are the 
uncertainty, ill-definition and elusiveness of its rules coupled with its indeterminate 
nature.231 But these concerns ought not to dissuade or otherwise foreclose efforts 
aimed at developing, over the long term, an autonomous new legal order for the FDI 
regime. This is in view of the apparent inability of the present regime, seemingly 
rendered rigid and hide-bound by existing principles, to reconcile the rival claims of 
the concepts of international property rights and sovereign rights. 
 
It is beyond the remit of this article to embark on a detail articulation of the 
substantive nature and content of the proposed lex specialis for the FDI regime. 
Rather what is proposed at this stage is a preliminary sketch of its basic nature, 
principal normative features and key functions. The conceptual basis of a future lex 
specialis for the FDI regime could be founded on the premise of an autonomous 
(stateless), unified and universally accepted system of law.232 What is thus 
envisaged is a specific legal and institutional framework serving as a comprehensive 
basis for the proper categorization of natural resources development agreements 
(and FDI as a whole) whilst also providing the basis for the applicable law. One of its 
key attributes would be the concept of „good faith‟. This will serve as the guiding 
principle for the interpretation by international arbitral and claims tribunals of the 
rights and obligations of the parties. Some comfort could well be drawn in this regard 
from the two arbitral awards in Petroleum Development Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi233 
and Sapphire International Petroleum v National Iranian Oil Company.234 The dicta in 
both awards, which were based on the “modern law of nature” and the common 
practice of civilized nations, relied to a great extent on the „spirit of good will‟, 
„integrity‟ and „reason‟ in reaching judgment.235  
 
    The normative development and evolution of the lex specialis would involve 
two key stages: firstly, defining its substantive content and sources; and secondly, 
identifying relevant rules of interpretation or judicial construction. On the first point, 
the lex specialis is not expected to be a completely new system of law. Rather, the 
process of defining its normative content will rely to a great extent on collating and 
streamlining relevant concepts and principles of the current international investment 
regime. From a categorization perspective the proposed new ECA and EPC 
concepts would provide the conceptual basis for the new regime as alternatives to 
the EDA.236 Within this framework equal voice will be accorded to FDI protection and 
to the realization of any identified or identifiable national economic development 
objectives of the project.237 The former objective will be ensured by reining in 
excessive, unreasonable or untenable host State claims to exclusive regulatory 
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competences or PSNR;238 the latter through the recognition that public power 
prerogatives are an inherent and undeniable feature of the FDI regime. Such 
prerogatives are in fact endemic to the very nature of petroleum or mineral 
development projects.  
 
The lex specialis would thus represent a genuine attempt at reconciling the 
doctrine of State responsibility with the principle of State sovereignty.239 It will strive 
to accord the same emphasis to the specific needs and requirements of both parties 
and to provide anticipatory mechanisms for mediation and dispute resolution in the 
event of a conflict. This in turn will involve an alignment of the interests of the FDI 
party with the long term interests of the host State vis-à-vis its national development 
objectives. The specific (pecuniary) interests of the FDI party are often easily 
ascertained; those of the host State less easily so. The rather vague and ambiguous 
concept of „national economic development objectives‟ will thus need articulating 
with a greater degree of clarity as part of the lex specialis process.  
 
The process of defining the substantive content of the lex specialis will involve 
two further stages: firstly, identifying the various normative sources; and secondly, 
collating the main body of rules and principles which will form the basis of the 
applicable law. The latter could well involve a codification process based on a list of 
principles similar to the twenty principles proposed by Lord Mustill or the seventy-
eight principles proposed by Professor Berger as the basis of the lex mercatoria.240 
As part of these principles, for instance, it may well be that the proposed ECA/EPC 
concepts assume a truly developmental function. Provision could be made, for 
instance, for the establishment of a „development fund‟ within the project agreement. 
The proposed ECA model, with its proclivity towards public law, would seem to be 
the more amenable of the two proposed concepts for accommodating such a fund. 
The development fund, comprising for instance proceeds from occasional taxes on 
windfall profits or financial penalties levied on the FDI party for breach of licensing 
conditions, could be ring-fenced for the realization of specific infrastructural or social 
projects identified and approved by both parties.  
 
A key obstacle to the process of collating the normative sources and 
substantive content of the lex specialis clearly lies in the question of legitimization. 
Political progress through cooperation between capital-importing and exporting 
countries (coupled with recognition, consent or acquiescence by the FDI community) 
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can be the only panacea to this problem. Within the institutional framework of 
international arbitral and claims practice the key contribution to the process will come 
in the form of judicial construction. The latter will involve an approach to 
interpretation within the framework of the proposed ECA/EPC concepts which 
accords an equal weighting to the need for FDI protection and the competing 
interests of host States. This will involve judicial recognition of the risk-reward 
equation as the guiding principle of FDI - i.e. that capital amortization and a 
reasonable rate of return on investments are legitimate expectations of the FDI party. 
It will equally involve an acknowledgement of the fact that the right of the host State 
to regulate is endemic to many FDI projects, as are domestic expectations regarding 
the project‟s contribution to national economic development.  
 
The most important aspect of judicial interpretation relates perhaps to 
stabilization provisions. It is posited that the new regime will involve a very narrow 
construction (restrictive interpretation) of stabilization provisions. In ascertaining their 
validity or effectiveness vis-à-vis FDI protection, the first point of reference ought to 
be relevant municipal law rules of constitutional and administrative law. Where such 
commitments on the part of the State are deemed to be unconstitutional or otherwise 
ultra vires under domestic rules they ought to be deemed equally invalid or 
ineffective within the context of the international investment regime. Secondly, 
assuming that the stabilization clause in question is valid under national law, it still 
ought to be very narrowly construed in accordance with the principle of „good faith‟ 
and with due regard to the equally important principle of the host State‟s sovereign 
right to regulate. The concepts of reasonableness and proportionality ought therefore 
to be the guiding principles of judicial construction. Stabilization clauses with 
unreasonably wide scope which seek to stifle regulatory initiative (e.g. the traditional 
“freezing” clause) could thus be deemed to be disproportionate in view of their 
erosive impact on the „right to regulate‟ and their cumulative effect on the long term 
functioning of the project agreement.241 Such clauses could thus be rendered null 
and void whereas compromise clauses such as the „compensation clause‟ could be 
deemed reasonable and valid.242 
 
Informing the new regime would be the critical linkage between FDI and its 
contribution to the economic and social development of the host State – i.e. the 
intertwining of the interests of the FDI party and those of the host State.243 One of 
the principal requirements of the OPIC insurance scheme, for example, is the 
expectation that the underwritten venture will contribute to national economic 
development.244 Similar to the once proposed international law of development, the 
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disposition of the new regime would not be strictly juridical but one approaching to 
the notion of equity.245 Its emphasis will thus be on global economic interdependence 
and the principles of transnational social justice.246 It will, of necessity, concern itself 
not just with legal protection for FDI but also with principles promoting effective 
national competence over the structures, policies and methods of developing 
domestic natural endowments.247 Such policies may include, for example, regulatory 
intervention by the State to promote environmentally sustainable practices such as 
conservation measures and the renewal of depleted resources. 
 
It is thus to be submitted that the mutuality of interests which lies at the heart 
of the lex specialis is of itself a more reliable and effective guarantor of the legal 
security of FDI. For on the latter depends the realization of much desired national 
economic development aspirations. It can reasonably be said that a host nation 
would hesitate to expropriate a project which is clearly conceived and designed in 
such a way as to make a significant contribution to its national development 
objectives.248 This proposition applies à fortiori if the venture is perceived to be 
already making an effective contribution to national development goals within the 
framework of an international investment regime which provides an enabling 
environment for the mutual realization of the interests and objectives of both parties. 
This in turn should ensure that the interests of any one party are not unnecessarily 
prejudiced, hence lessening the scope for friction and conflict.  
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The stability, variation and breach of natural resources development 
agreements involving the infusion of FDI (and attendant problems) has been the 
principal theme informing this study. The enduring nature of these problems within 
the FDI regime does not necessarily imply the futility or impotency of international 
law as a regulatory tool.249 But what is clearly evident is the need for a corpus juris 
with the required degree of consistency, as well as the basic ability, to reconcile the 
divergent interests which all form part of the legal framework for the international 
development of domestic natural resources. It has to be a regime founded on a 
universal perception of real authority combined with an expectation of certainty and a 
reasonable degree of permanence. Its role as a dispute settlement mechanism may 
well extend beyond a purely adjudicative process to include aspects of mediation. 
One of its key functions would thus be to serve as a conciliatory intercessor in the 
conflict between international property rights and sovereign rights.  
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It is to be submitted, however, that a key obstacle lies in the absence of a 
unified system of binding precedent applying to the international investment regime. 
The result can be seen in the inconsistent and conflicting arbitration outcomes noted 
earlier.250 Attaining the key attributes of authority and permanence relies partly on a 
system based on judicial consistency and uniformity of judgments. But it is difficult to 
see how these attributes can be attained without a unified system of binding 
arbitration in which judgments rendered by international arbitral and claims tribunals 
acquire precedential value and status.   
 
Contractual practice will clearly need to evolve in line with any new regime. If 
indeed the development aspect is an endemic feature of resources agreements, then 
such objectives ought to be given more prominence in probative contract terms as 
opposed to being relegated to the memoranda of understanding, recitals, preambles, 
„heads of agreement„, press releases or other such sub-contractual instruments. The 
often grandiose nature of the pronouncements in such instruments (sometimes 
approaching to pomposity) contain in the main ritualistic incantations which are 
remarkable only for their vagueness and opacity. It could be argued that the breadth 
and latitude of the language used in these instruments has the general effect of 
downgrading the „development objectives‟ stated therein to a sub-legal category of 
contractual intentions. The desired objectives, in effect, acquire the character of a 
political wish list devoid of any real strategy for implementation. The trained eye of 
the lawyer is clearly able to see beneath the fig leaf of such „commitments‟ the near 
absence of substantive content in the form of legally enforceable obligations vis-à-vis 
the achievement of the stated objectives. 
 
One of the main findings of this article has been the problems associated with 
stabilization.251 Its most extreme rendering, the “freezing” provision, can be a rather 
crude and abrasive tool (vis-à-vis its circumscriptive effect on the scope and exercise 
of the doctrine of State sovereignty) for containing the problem of political risks. One 
of its undesired effects could be to exacerbate rather than to lessen the friction 
between international property rights and sovereign rights. The inflexibility of 
„freezing clauses‟ could thus, over the long term, become a catalyst for friction and 
conflict within the relationship.252 It is thus to be submitted (given the protective 
function of the principle of State responsibility) that the stabilization clause amounts 
to an extraneous contraption on the already heavily studded armor of customary 
international law. From the perspective of FDI protection they are an unnecessary - 
and arguably, avoidable - embellishment of an already protective international 
investment regime.253 Much has already been written on the question of the 
incongruous nature of the relationship between stabilization provisions and the 
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concept of State sovereignty.254 It is further posited that the widespread recognition 
and enforcement of such provisions could lend the impression of an over-indulgence 
of the FDI party under the current international investment regime. It is also the case 
that under some municipal legal systems such clauses violate domestic 
constitutional law prescriptions as well as the clauses exhorbitantes concept of 
administrative law.255  
 
Within the framework of the current FDI regime it could be argued that such 
provisions violate the spirit of the EDA concept.256 And from a political and public 
relations perspective, their effect on the domestic political scene could well be 
counter-productive in spawning accusations of “sovereign capitulation” or the 
granting of excessive, exclusive and discriminatory favors to foreign economic 
interests.257 Over time these accusations could arouse patriotic sentiments in the 
government of the day, the undesired consequence of which could be the very 
intervention which the clause sought to avoid.  
 
In as much as the concept of domestic control or national sovereignty is an 
inherent feature in the management and development of domestic natural 
endowments, regulatory intervention by the State will ineluctably remain an implicit 
factor in the equation. This remains the case regardless of any guarantees of non-
intervention contained in the project agreement or in BITs.258 Diligence and prudence 
thus counsel a more dynamic approach to political risk management. If indeed 
stabilization is considered an imperative feature of the risk management strategy, 
then such provisions ought to be conceived and drafted in such a manner as not to 
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stifle the natural evolution of municipal law within the framework of the project 
agreement.259 Nor should they (or the agreement) be unduly permissive of 
government actions which pose a significant threat to the long term stability of the 
relationship. Stabilization provisions, if at all necessary, should thus be very limited in 
their scope, objectives and duration.260 Their primary objective should be to promote 
a practical and working FDI relationship. In this regard “cooperation clauses”,261 
adjustment or renegotiation clauses and the “compensation” version of the 
stabilization clause are all well placed to serve as alternatives to the traditional 
„freezing‟ version of the clause.262 More use could also be made of alternative 
political risks management strategies.263 
 
After taking account of the wide range of scholarly opinions and the various 
historical and normative developments which have been highlighted in this study, it 
thus remains the case that the current international investment regime, when in full 
sail, flies primarily the colors of the traditional school with the „Hull formula‟ as its 
chief ensign. This to the near exclusion of peremptory norms jus cogens.264 The pre-
eminence of established principles of customary international law and its auxiliaries 
in the international investment regime can clearly be seen through their pervasive 
influence on the outcomes of both past and recent international arbitration and 
claims practice.265 Traditional principles of customary international law have clearly 
have acquired a much louder voice in the international investment regime. However, 
the unease and discontent with the regime remains in many quarters as evidenced 
by the recent events in Latin America.266 Viewed from this perspective the recent 
paradigm shift in capital-importing countries towards investment promotion and 
protection in the sector could well be argued to be perfunctory, perhaps even a mere 
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sophistry. Slowly but inexorably the cycle continues to revolve. The pendulum will 
inevitably reach the other end of the spectrum. For until such a time that there is a 
genuine international consensus based on universally accepted rules, the 
international investment regime will continue to suffer from what could be said to be 
a legitimization deficit. 
 
The ultimate conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the problems 
highlighted may not be as intractable or as elusive as they appear at first sight to be. 
These divergent and discordant strands all point towards the requirement for a 
reformed international investment regime. This could perhaps take the form of a new 
lex specialis to govern the FDI process - a regime with a distinctive sui generis 
character better suited to cater for the specific temperament, peculiarities and even 
the idiosyncrasies of FDI agreements. It is posited that the new regime will need to 
embrace within its framework key aspects of the international law of development.267 
It will need to balance the requirement for FDI protection with an approach which is 
sensitive to events or “changes taking place in the real world outside of the disputed 
documents”.268 It would be expected that a rethinking of the customary international 
law compensation requirement vis-à-vis its remedial function will form part and 
parcel of this renewal process. The „Hull formula‟, which serves as the bedrock of the 
customary international law compensation requirement, and the specific problems 
which arise from its application within the framework of contemporary international 
economic law, will constitute the subject matter of a further separate study.   
 
                                                          
267
 Cf. Wolfgang Friedmann, The Relevance of International Law to the Processes of Economic and Social 
Development, 60 A.S.I.L PROCS. 8 (1966). 
268
 See further Higgins, supra note 154, at 233-35; see also C.F. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967), at 12. Regarding the need for investment protection Chandler, supra note 68, at 
526 has correctly argued that the investment of surplus capital abroad and the operation of the principle of 
State responsibility go hand in hand, and that the indispensable business of international trade and foreign 
investment will cease whenever the protection of the correlative law of nations against the confiscation of 
foreign-owned property is repudiated. 
